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While federal and state legislatures have largely ignored wide-spread and 
acute deficiencies in the programs that ensure representation for the vast 
majority of individuals accused of crime,' an unprecedented number of 
actually innocent-wrongly convicted-men have been freed from prison or 
death row.2 Recent investigations into the causes of these wrongful 
convictions reveal that bad lawyering significantly contributed to many of the 
adjudicatory disaster^.^ I believe these multiple and damning revelations4 will 
encourage bar associations and law reform organizations to challenge 
inadequate criminal defense delivery systems in the courts and motivate courts 
to hear and decide the claims. My certainty is bolstered by a coherent and 
compelling philosophy ofjudicial policy making hypothesized by MalcolmM. 
Feeley and Edward L. Rubiri from their study of the role the courts played in 
1. DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL JUSTICE 92 (1999) ("Providing genuinely adequate counsel for poor 
defendants would require a substantial infusion of money and indigent defense is the last thing the populace 
will voluntarily direct its tax dollars to fund. Achieving solutions to this problem through the political 
process is a pipe dream."); Donald A. Dripps, Criminal Procedure, Footnote Four, and the Theory of 
Public Choice; or, Why Don't Legislatures Give A Damn About the Rights of the Accused?, 44 SYRACUSE 
L. REV. 1079 (1993) (explaining in a fun and forceful essay why the legislature will never adequately fund 
criminal defense since most people arrested and charged with crimes are members of a small sliver of 
society-young minority males-whose rights everyone else feels fairly sanguine about ignoring). Lack 
of legislative support for defense services is discussed infra at notes 96 through 98 and accompanying text. 
2. JIM DWYER, PETER NEUFELD AND BARRY SCHECK., ACTUAL INNOCENCE: FIVE DAYS TO 
EXECUTION A D OTHER DISPATCHES FROM THE WRONGLY CONVICTED (2000) (containing case studies of 
wrongful convictions, explaining which factors in the criminal justice system contributed to their 
occurrence, and proposing changes). 
3. James S. Leibman, Jeffrey Fagan & Valerie West, A Broken System: Error Rates in Capital 
Cases 1973- 1995, Executive Summary, at ii (finding that incompetence of defense lawyers is a major cause 
of reversal of convictions in state capital cases). See also Ken Armstrong & Steve Mills, Inept Defenses 
Cloud Verdicts, CHI. TRIB., Nov. 15, 1999,s 1, at 1 (reporting that of the twelve men originally sentenced 
to death "in Illinois who have been exonerated since 1987, four were represented at trial by an attorney who 
has been disbarred or suspended"). 
4. To those of us who work as public defenders, or assigned counsel, or who are involved in efforts 
to support and improve the provision of defense services, these revelations are not a surprise. Some of the 
most persuasive commentary on the inadequacies of defense services was written over twenty-five years 
ago by David L. Bazelon, The Defective Assistance of Counsel, 42 U .  Cfi.  L. REV. 1 (1973) and The 
Realities of Gideon and Argersinger, 64 CEO. L.J. 81 1 (1976). A great deal more has been written since 
then. For some of the most damning critiques see RICHARD KLEIN & ROBERT SPANGENBERG, THE 
INDIGENT DEFENSE CRISIS (1993); Vivian 0. Berger, The Supreme Court and Defense Counsel: Old 
Roads, New Paths-A Dead End?, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 9 (1986); Stephen B. Bright, Neither Equal nor 
Just: The Rationing and Denial of Legal Services to the Poor when Life and Liberty are at Stake, 1997 
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 783; Richard Klein, The Emperor Gideon Has No Clothes: The Empty Promise of the 
Constitutional Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 625 (1986). 
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reforming the prison system during the 1 9 6 0 ' ~ . ~  To understand the power of 
their thesis, it is necessary to look at Talley v. stephens6--one of the ground- 
breaking prison reform cases upon which their philosophy rests. 
In 1965, the Arkansas State Penitentiary was administered in the style of 
a southern plantation. Crops were grown for profit and prisoners worked in 
the fields, watched over by other prisoners-not by professional guards.' 
Whipping was inflicted for an inmate's failure to work hard e n ~ u g h . ~  It was 
imposed summarily. The extent and severity of the punishment was 
determined at the whim of the prison employee holding the whip? 
In 1965, no case law existed that interpreted the Eighth Amendment to 
ban corporeal prison punishment."' Nonetheless, that year Judge J. Smith 
Henley, of the United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Arkansas, although unwilling to read a broad prohibition against corporeal 
punishment into the language of the Constitution, found a way to enjoin 
whipping in the penitentiary: he determined that whipping could not be 
inflicted without procedural safeguards." 
Until then, courts refused to intervene in the operation of prisons. When 
asked to consider the appropriateness or constitutionality of prison conditions 
' 
or discipline, courts focused on the needs of prison officials and the general 
public and were sympathetic, in the main, to the difficulties of running a safe 
and orderly correctional institution.'' Judge Henley looked at the prisons from 
a different point of view. He saw the inmates and their plight at the hands of 
the prison authorities. He understood the interests of the administrators, but, 
at the same time, he did not let those considerations eclipse judicial concern 
for the inmates.13 
5. MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAK~NG AND THE MODERN 
STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA'S PRISONS (1998). 
6. 247 F. Supp. 683 (E.D. Ark. 1965). 
7. FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 5, at 52-53. 
8. Id. at 54. 
9. Talley, 247 F .  Supp. at 687-88. 
10. In fact until the 1960's. an unspoken but powerful "hands-OW' doctrine prevented judges from 
intervening in the administration of prisons and from applying constitutional protections to prisoners. See 
MICHAEL B. MUSHLIN, RIGHTS OF PRISONERS 5 1.02 (2d ed. 1993). 
I I. Talley, 247 F .  Supp. at 689. 
12. MUSHLIN, supra note 10, at 7-8. 
13. Talley, 247 F. Supp. at 686 (stating that 
On the other hand, convicts must be disciplined, and prison authorities must be given wide latitude 
and discretion in the management and operation of their institutions, including the disciplining of 
inmates. The Courts cannot take over the management of prisons, and they cannot undertake to 
review every complaint made by a convict about his treatment while in the prison.). 
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Judge Henley's efforts to reform the Arkansas prison system did not end 
with an injunction against whipping at the Arkansas Penitentiary, and Talley 
was not the last case that he would decide. In fact, until 1977, two years after 
he joined the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, Judge Henley presided over a 
series of cases involving the administration of the Arkansas prison system.I4 
His decisions were not limited to a single institution.I5 They affected the 
entire prison system in the state.16 Ultimately, he condemned not just 
corporeal punishment, but the entire plantation prison system that worked the 
inmates for profit." 
To guide his decision-making, Judge Henley appointed lawyers to 
represent the plaintiff-prisoners, held hearings, listened to the testimony of 
expert witnesses, inspected the prisons himself, assigned special masters to 
implement court orders, and supervised the reform efforts.'' By the time the 
prison litigation was reassigned, Judge Henley, with the support of the Eighth 
Circuit, had succeeded in transforming the Arkansas prison system from top 
to bottom; and in so doing, he had re-interpreted the Constitution. Without a 
doubt, Judge Henley took an activist approach to his decision-making. He 
refused to confine himself to the relief requested by the initial inmate 
plaintiffs; instead, he issued broad injunctive relief requiring systemic 
reform.19 He issued many and very detailed orders. His involvement was 
administrative and managerial.'' 
Feeley and Rubin applaud Judge Henley's aggressive and creative judicial 
policy making.*' Their treatise explains and justifies the form of judicial 
activism that Judge Henley' prison decisions exemplify.22 They suggest that 
before a judge will engage in this kind of work, the judge must be motivated 
and motivated by a discontinuity between the judge's personal moral belief 
and reality.23 Second, the court must have a grant of jurisdiction that 
14. FEELEY & RUBLN, supra note 5, at 55-74. 
15. Id. 
16. Id. 
17. Jackson v. Bishop, 404 F.2d 571 (8th Cir. 1968); Finney v. Hutto, 410F. Supp. 251 (E.D. Ark. 
1976); Holt v. Hutto, 363 F. Supp. 194 (E.D. Ark. 1973); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362 (E.D. Ark. 
1970). 
18. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. at 364; FEELEY & RUBIN supra note 5, at 66-73. 
19. See FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 5, at 51-79. 
20. See id. at 55-73. 
21. Seeid.at211-90. 
22. See id. 
23. When Judge Henley was confronted with a challenge to the arbitrary infliction of corporeal 
punishment, 
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authorizes action.24 Third, the court must be able to formulate a "coordinating 
idea" or coherent philosophy providing the framework for action.25 Finally, 
a judge confronted with an issue or a problem must be able to access the 
knowledge or information necessary to create a solution.26 
The motivation for intervention in the prison system was, in part, 
provided by the civil rights movement of the 1960's." Judges received letters 
from inmates describing the ghastly conditions of their c~nfinement .~~ Many 
of the prisoners were African-Americans imprisoned in facilities run by white 
guards.29 The conditions began to appear out of step with the civilization the 
United States government was trying to build outside the prison system--out 
of step with the civil rights movement and out of step with progress.30 The 
racial divide between those who were serving time and those who supervised 
the punishment emphasized the cruel and backward nature of the confinement. 
There was a disparity between the conditions of the prisoners-about which 
the judges were becoming better and better informed-and the direction in 
which the rest of the nation was moving. At a time when the country was 
moving towards integration, equality and prosperity for all citizens, life in 
prison was mired in racism and oppression. The more the judges knew about 
the world behind bars, the more they were motivated to i n t e~ene .~ '  
As to the second requirement, a grant of jurisdiction authorizing 
intervention, Feeley and Rubin suggest that Eighth Amendment jurisprudence, 
like the growth of First Amendment jurisprudence in the context of the prison 
religious discrimination decisions, provided the necessary f~undation.~' The 
[tlhe dominant image of the South [in the 1960'sI was of a troubled, backward region in resentful 
transition, a region of red-necked sheriffs, segregation academies, police dogs, fire hoses, grinding ' 
poverty, and the murderers of Martin Luther King, Medgar Evers, and those New York civil rights ' 
. workers. Federal judges probably felt more personally motivated to displace southern institutions 
than at any time since the early days of Reconstruction. 
Id. at 221. 
24. See id. at 207. 'The first force. . . that acts upon judges when they are creating new doctrine 
is existing legal doctrine-not a particular text, but existing doctrine as a whole." Id. at 213. 
25. See id. at 233. 
26. See id. at 162-67 (stating that the Berger Court would have overturned the prison decisions 
without the information in the national standards upon which the court relied). 
27. Id. at 159. 
28. Id. at 150. 
29. Id. 
30. Id. at 221. 
31. Id. 
32. Id.at 14-15. 171.206-07. 
Over a period of about five years, [Judge Henley] gradually r e a l i d  that the totality of the 
conditions in the prison could be regarded as a generalized violation of the Eighth Amendment. 
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Eighth Amendment opened a doorway permitting scrutiny of prison conditions 
and application of constitutional principles to sentenced prisoners. 
The third condition for judicial activism is the ability to frame what 
Feeley and Rubin term a "coordinating ideaw-a judicial philosophy or theme 
to ground a specific decision.33 Judge Henley developed two. One was the 
idea that prisons must provide rehabilitati~n~~ and the other was that the 
supervision of prisoners must be bureaucratized rather than arbitrary.35 Judge 
Henley held that if a prison rule were not designed to rehabilitate, it could not 
be con~titutional.~~ This insight gave form and organization to his 
intervention. Through that prism, he could look at any aspect of prison life 
from employment, to disciplinary rules, to visitation and access to the courts, 
and ask whether the prison rule served the goal of rehabilitation. 
Even with a coordinating idea, courts need information to actualize a 
notion of fairness. The development of standards for the administration of 
prisons provided the information necessary to implement reform. The 
American Correctional Association ("ACA") published a Manual of 
Correctional Standards in 1946.37 In 1959, the ACA published a second 
edition that "contained a new chapter entitled 'Legal Rights of Probationers, 
Prisoners and Parolees' . . . [which] enumerated a set of 'legal rights' for 
prisoners, actually policy standards drawn from various international 
sources."38 Distributed in a usable, readable, and comprehensive form, the 
standards rendered the abstract notion of cruel and unusual punishment 
justiciable by providing the courts with concrete guidance about appropriate 
correctional behavior.39 
This enabled him to bypass the complex and perhaps insuperable task of matching specific 
conditions with specific constitutional provisions, or of defining particularized rights that prisoners 
possessed. 
Id. at 226. 
33. See id. at 226-33, 242. Once a court finds the moral imperative and the doctrinal authority 
justifying intervention, it must locate guidelines for action. There are a variety of ways to decide cases 
when there is little controlling precedent. Judges use analogies and metaphors and they listen to public 
policy arguments. Feeley and Rubin suggest that, in addition, courts can imagine a theoretical framework 
to explain their decision. See id. at 237-41. 
34. Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362,378-81 (E.D. Ark. 1970). 
35. Talley v. Stephens, 247 F. Supp. 683,689 (E.D. Ark. 1965). 
36. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. at 379. 
37. FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 5, at 163. 
38. Id. at 163. 
39. AM. CORR. ASS'N, MANUAL OF CORRECTIONAL STANDARDS 266-79 (3d ed. 1966) at Part III 
Chapter 15; see also FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 5, at 163 (noting that Chapter 15 is a new addition to 
the manual). 
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Once a framework for intervention was modeled, judges across the 
country eagerly applied the Constitution to prisons, ending brutal  practice^.^' 
The judges were undaunted by the fact that their decisions would cost money 
and could be attacked as an arrogation of the legislative function. They were 
not intimidated by the traditional argument that courts do not have sufficient 
expertise to become involved in the management of prisons. Judges were 
asked to intervene to end brutal practices in prisons, and they did.41 Often the 
cases could not be decided with a simple order. In those cases, judges used 
innovative techniques to manage the litigation-techniques more typically 
employed by administrative agencies rather than courtsP2 Most radical was 
the use of special masters-powerful "special assistants9'-who investigated 
conditions and oversaw the implementation of ordersP3 Further, following the 
lead of Monroe v. P a ~ e ; ~  the judges used their injunctive 
powers-"enjoin[ing] prison administrators from maintaining any feature of 
the prison that failed to meet the rehabilitative standard."45 Finally, judges 
retained jurisdiction over the litigation, sometimes for years, to ensure that the 
changes they desired were im~lernented.4~ 
Courts that are asked to reform criminal defense delivery systems today 
are in much the same position as was Judge Henley in 1965. Exonerations of 
the innocent and exposCs of malpractice by defense counsel in even the most 
serious prosecutions provide motivation for judicial intervention. Moreover, 
the job of improving indigent defense systems is uniquely suited to the 
judiciary. Courts are aware of the deficiencies in the delivery of criminal 
defense services.4' Judges preside over criminal trials and pleas. They are 
40. FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 5, at 39-40 ("In the five-year period after the Arkansas case was 
decided, federal courts declared prisons in Mississippi, Oklahoma, Florida, Louisiana, and Alabama to be 
unconstitutional, in whole or part. Five years after that, prisons or prison systems in twenty-eight more 
jurisdictions had been added to this lugubrious list. . . ."). Id. 
41. See generally MUSHLIN, supra note 10, 5 2.04, at 52 (commenting that "formal corporeal 
punishment has virtually disappeared from the correctional scene . . ." and discussing the effect of the 
Supreme Court decision in Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1.4-5 (1992)). 
42. See generally MUSHLIN, supra note 10, 8 2.14, at 117-19 (discussing remedies). 
43. See id. at 75 ("The power to appoint a compliance coordinator, more familiarly known as a 
special master, is traditionally regarded as an inherent power of an equity court and is explicitly authorized 
by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure."). 
44. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). 
45. FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 5, at 256. 
46. The Arkansas prison system was subject to Judge Henley and later Judge Eisle's jurisdiction for 
a total of seventeen years. See id. at 51-79. 
47. HONORABLE JONATHANLIPPMAN,CHIEFADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE &HONORABLE JUANITABING 
NEWON, DEPUTY CHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE JUDGE, ASSIGNED COUNSEL COMPENSATION PLAN IN NEW 
YORK: A GROWING CRISIS (Jan. 2000) [hereinafter ASSIGNED COUNSELREPORT] (on file with the Oftice 
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confronted by crowded calendars, hasty pleas and badly tried cases. Judges 
understand the role of the criminal defense lawyer and the significance of a 
zealous defense. Ultimately the courts are responsible for the administration 
of justice, not simply in individual cases,48 but also ~ystemically.~~ The unique 
role of the judiciary in supervising "justice," combined with the well- 
documented inadequacies of institutional defense services provide motivation 
for judicial intervention. 
New tools exist to assist judges in formulating effective and far-reaching 
rulings about the inadequacies of criminal defense counsel. Until recently, 
courts faced with claims of constitutionally infirm public defense services 
lacked a functional definition of effective assistance of counsel that could be 
applied prospectively and systemically. The traditional, accepted way of 
measuring effectiveness of counsel in criminal cases is to review the 
representation after its c~mple t ion .~~  Thus, a particular attorney's work on a 
specific case would be examined only after the conviction or appeal and only 
in relation to the results of the attorney's efforts. If the conviction were 
supported by the trial evidence, the attorney's performance generally would 
be deemed effective." Thus, the Strickland standard asks a reviewing court 
to focus almost exclusively on case outcomes. 
However, if courts are concerned only with outcomes, they are more 
likely to be satisfied with a lawyer's efforts so long as his or her clients 
receive the "market" value for their cases.52 An after-the-fact approach 
of Court Administration). 
48. To be sure, courts have an arsenal of tools that could be aimed at improving the defense 
function. Judges are often aware that an individual assigned counsel or public defender is performing 
poorly for a client. When that occurs, the court may threaten the lawyer with sanctions, report the 
inadequacies to the appropriate administrative body, or substitute one counsel for another. Such action may 
or may not improve the lot of the particular defendant, but it most certainly does not affect broader change. 
49. Cfi N.Y. LAW $5 460-96 (McKinney 1983 & Supp. 2001) (courts have the inherent power to 
regulate the practice of law-as reflected by the statutes, such as New York's Judiciary Law, which delegate 
to the courts the authority to determine the qualifications for admission to practice). 
I 50. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (reviewing an ineffective 
representation claim after the defendant had been convicted of the charges against him). 
51. See id. discussed further infra at note 110, and accompanying text. 
52. In any jurisdiction all cases have what the author refers to as a particular "market" value. 
"Market" value changes as it is affected by the fluctuating political priorities. If a neighborhood has 
recently complained about the presence of prostitutes on its streets, a local district attorney may respond 
by recommending tougher plea bargains to all arrested prostitutes, hoping that stricter sentences will force 
the trade into another part of town. The crackdown on prostitution will alter the "market value" of a 
prostitution case in that district attorney's jurisdiction. If all prostitutes are sentenced to thirty days in jail, 
then the court will believe that any prostitute who is sentenced to that number of days has been presumably 
effectively represented. Likewise the courts will believe that an attorney can effectively represent a large 
number of prostitutes very quickly so long as each one receives a sentence of thirty days. 
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minimizes the value of much of what an attorney does for a client during the 
pendency of the case. It devalues the time the attorney might spend explaining 
the charges to a client, investigating a drug treatment alternative to jail, or 
inquiring about care for the client's children during the jail term-let alone 
planning a challenge to the arresting officer's credibility. 
Although some commentators have discussed using other kinds' of 
standards to evaluate attorney performance, the idea has not generated much 
e~citement.'~ Part of the reason for the lack of progress has been the difficulty 
of adapting existing performance standards to the task of e~a lua t ion .~~ 
Another part of the reason might be the reticence of the defense community 
to accept the idea that their professional role could be reduced to a set of 
skills, tasks, or competencies. Finally, part of the reason is likely that defense 
attorneys themselves tend to devalue all lawyering skills other than those 
which seem particularly necessary to a "good" outcome-e.g. a scathing 
cross-examination or a particularly comfortable knack for plea-bargaining. 
53. There is wide-spread support for adoption and implementation of eligibility 
standards-especially in death penalty cases. See, e.g., Norman Lefstein, Reform of Defense 
Representation in Capital Cases: The Indiana Experience and its Implications for the Nation, 29 IND. L. 
REV. 495 (1996) (discussing Indiana's rule attempting to provide more effective representation in such 
cases); Michael D. Moore, Tinkering with the Machinery of Death: An Examination andAnalysis of State 
Indigent Defense Systems and Their Application to Death-Eligible Defendants, 37 WM. &MARY L. REV. 
1617 (1996) (arguing that states should organize units specializing in representation of indigent defendants 
in capital cases). See also MUSHLIN, supra note 10. A few commentators have suggested evaluating 
attorney effectiveness with performance standards. See Donald A. Dripps, Ineffective Assistance of 
Counsel: The Case for an Ex Ante Purify Standard, 88 J. CRIM. L. &CRIMINOLOGY 242,286-306 (1997) 
(arguing for the implementation of an ex ante standard for determining effectiveness of counsel in indigent 
defense cases) [hereinafter Ex Ante Standard]; William J. Genego, The Future of Effective Assistance of 
Counsel: Performance Standards and Competent Representation, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 181 (1984) 
(discussing how performance standards might improve the quality of criminal defense representation 
generally, and why they should replace the Strickland standard in case-by-case determinations of appeals 
for ineffectiveness of counsel); Martin C. Calhoun, Note, How to Thread the Needle: Toward a Checklist- 
Based Standard for Evaluating Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims, 77 GEO. L.J. 413 (1988) (to the 
same effect); Ex Anre Standard, supra (suggesting that institutional reform litigation, as well as the review 
of criminal individual cases, would benefit from a prospective (ex ante) approach to the evaluation of 
- - - - 
effectiveness where the standards would be parity a comparison of the resources of the defender office with 
the resources enjoyed by their adversaries-the prosecutors). Even Judge Bazelon used a standards-based 
app'roach to evaluate attorney effectiveness in United States v. DeCoster, 487 F.2d 1197, 1202-04 (D.C. 
Cir. 1973). rev'd by 624 F.2d 196 (D.C. Cir. 1979). Chief Judge Bazelon used the ABA Standards and 
AMSTERDAM, SEGAL AND MILLER'S TRIAL MANUAL FOR THE DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL CASES to define 
ineffectiveness. Id. at 1203 nn.27,28. His efforts were soundly rejected by the Circuit. See DeCoster, 624 
F.2d at 205. 
54. The various types of standards-performance. eligibility, and administration-as well as their 
particular strengths and weaknesses are discussed infra Part IV. 
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There is evidence, however, that defense attorneys today see their roles 
differently than did their predecessors twenty-five years ago.55 New defender 
offices are emphasizing a holistic approach to client repre~entation,~~ and the 
federal government is encouraging this development by funding alternative 
courts and supporting defense lawyers who focus on client treatment and 
di~ersion.~' 
At the same time, the defense community has been increasingly interested 
in standards. Assigned Counsel Plans are adopting "Eligibility Standards" 
detailing the experience and training required for assignment to particular 
classes of cases.58 "Performance Standards" describe case preparation tasks.59 
"Administration Standards" guide the operation of institutional  provider^.^' 
This interest has coincided with an invigorated regard for a wide range of 
clients' pre-trial due process rights. 
55. See generally Abbe Smith, Criminal Responsibility, Social Responsibility, and Angry Young 
Men: Reflections of a Feminist Criminal Defense Lawyer, 21 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 433 
(1994-1995) (suggesting that defenders and the entire criminal justice system should learn more about the 
clients andtheir personal histories so that juries can see crime in context and be given an opportunity to 
empathize with defendants as well as with victims). 
56. See, e.g., Cait Clarke, Problem-Solving Defenders in the Community: Expanding the 
Institutional Boundaries of Providing Defense Counsel to the Poor, 14 GEO. J.  LEGALETHICS 401,427-58 
(2001) (discussing many examples, including, The Bronx Defenders, a new contract office in New York 
City, that sends its staff attorneys into the schools to explain the value of criminal defense, provides free 
AIDS and HIV testing to clients, and makes its extensive social work services available to clients). 
57. The federal government has been instrumental in supporting "problem-solving" courts where 
persons arrested for crimes are diverted into treatment and community service. See, e.g., DRUG COURT 
CLEARMG HOUSE AND TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE PROJECT, DRUG COURTS PROGRAM OFFICE, OFF~CE OF 
JUSTICEPROGRAMS, U. . DEP'TOFJUSTICE,LOOKINGATADECADEOFDRUGCOURTS (last visited Nov. 12, 
2001), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/dcpo/decade98.htm; ERIC LEE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 
COMMUNITY COURTS: AN EVOLVINGMODEL, available at http:Nwww.ncjrs.org.pdffilesl/bja/l83452.pdf 
(2000). In these courts, characteristically judges, prosecutors and defenders must work together, as 
collaborators not adversaries, to formulate solutions to defendants' problems. The "problem-solving" 
approach may educate the courts to the importance of case processing. 
58. In recent years, standards for defense services have proliferated. The Institute for Law and 
Justice, supported by the Bureau of Justice Assistance, United States Department of Justice, has just 
published electronically a Compendium of Standards for Indigent Defense Systems which includes a broad 
range of standards. INSTITUTE FOR LAW AND JUSTICE, Compendium of Standards For Indigent Defense 
Systems, available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/indigentdefense/compendiuwelcome.htd (2000) 
[hereinafter Compendium]. STANDARDS FOR THE ADMINISTRATION OF ASSIGNED COUNSEL SYSTEMS 
(National Legal Aid and Defender Ass'n 1989). 
59. Compendium; STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE 
FUNCTION (1993). 
60. ~ o n t ~ e n d i u m ;  GUIDELMES FOR LEGAL DEFENSE SYSTEMS IN THE UNITED STATES (National 
Legal Aid and Defender Ass'n 1976); GENERAL REQUIREMENTS FOR ALL ORGANIZED PROVIDERS OF 
DEFENSE SERVICES TO INDIGENT DEFENDANTS (New York City Indigent Defense Org. Oversight Cornm. 
1997). 
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The development and implementation of standards for the delivery of 
defense services is both a reflection of the changing conception of defense 
work and a trigger for ~hange .~ '  Not only do performance standards 
incorporate a broad range of lawyering skills as essential components of the 
defense function, but the very process of developing standards (whether 
performance, eligibility or administration standards) suggests the business of 
providing defense services is becoming more organized, methodical, and 
ultimately more amenable to evaluation. Although standards may serve 
multiple other purposeslb2 they also provide courts with a better measure for 
evaluating defense delivery systems than a measure that 'considers only 
outcomes. Standards make challenges to defense delivery systems more 
justiciable. 
Additionally, today sufficient precedent exists to .support judicial 
intervention. Lawsuits brought by attorneys asserting their own constitutional 
rights have paved the way for claims asserting the rights of defendants to 
quality defense services.63 Challenges to underfunded and overburdened 
public defenders, assigned counsel programs, and contract providers have 
been mounted successfully in a number of jurisdictions-both rural and 
urban.@ This litigation has pushed courts to re-consider the meaning of 
constitutionally "effective" representation and to recognize that effective 
assistance of counsel can be measured prospectively by looking at working 
conditions and pre-trial preparat i~n.~~ 
In this article, I first, suggest that the current deplorable state of criminal 
defense services should provide a motivation for judicial action. Then, I 
review the precedent providing the foundation for judicial action. In the third 
section, I discuss the standards applicable to defense services. In the final 
section, I speculate about the changing role of the criminal defense attorney 
and how that evolution might hasten judicial action. 
61. Compendium; Performance, eligibility and administration standards arediscussed infra Part N. 
62. Standards can be used to educate the public and funding sources about what it takes to provide 
quality defense services, to provide notice to the organizations of what is expected of a publically funded 
defense office, and as an internal training tool for the lawyers employed in a defense organization. Adele 
Bernhard, Private Bar Monitors Public Defense, A.B.A. CRIM. JUST.  MAG., Spring 1998, at 25-30. 
63. See discussion infra Part III.A. 1 .  
64. See discussion infra Part m.B. 
65. See discussion infra Part III. 
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11. MOTIVATION FOR INTERVENTION: INSTITUTIONALIZED 
INEFFECTIVENESS 
Most people arrested and charged with a criminal offense are too poor to 
hire their own counsel.66 Since 1963, courts have guaranteed counsel, 
appointed free of charge, to everyone charged with a crime punishable by loss 
of l ibert~.~'  Organizing the provision of these essential services to the 
millions arrested each year@' has been a daunting task, made more difficult by 
the judicial resistance to actively ensuring effective or meaningful 
as~is tance,~~ and by the public's lack of support for the f~nction. '~ Defense 
services for the poor are structured either as assigned counsel plans, private 
for-profit or not-for-profit law firms with government contracts to provide 
services, or public defender offices. The quality of services provided varies 
tremendously. 
A. Assigned Counsel Plans 
Assigned counsel, private practitioners who are paid by the hour from 
public funds, represent the majority of people arrested in this country.71 To 
be appointed to cases, assigned counsel attorneys generally are required to do 
66. In many jurisdictions, public or assigned defenders represent the overwhelming majority-as 
many as 90%--of those arrested. See Robert L. Spangenberg & Marea L. Beeman, Indigent Defense 
Systems in the United States, 58 LAW &CONTEMP. ROBS. 31,31-32 (1995). CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, 
U.S. DEPARTMENTOF JUSTICE, DEFENSE COUNSEL IN CRIMINALCASES (2000) (reporting that in 1996 court- 
appointed counsel represented 82% of all persons charged with a felony in the 75 largest counties in the 
country). 
67. See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (holding that the right to counsel is 
fundamental for a fair trial); Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972) (holding that the Sixth Amendment 
guarantees the right to counsel to all indigent criminal defendants). 
68. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebooW1995/pdf/t549.pdf (last updated Sept. 19, 2001) (in 1996 there were 
approximately one million felony and eight million misdemeanor arrests in the United States). 
69. Judicial reluctance to enforce Sixth Amendment rights in a meaningful way has taken many 
forms. Most important has been the Supreme Court decision in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 
(1984). which many commentators blame for judicial acceptance of egregiously deficient lawyering. See, 
e.g., Klein, supra note 4 (arguing that Strickland will be negative precedent); Richard Klein, The 
Relationship of the Court and Defense Counsel: The Impact on Competent Representation and Proposals 
for Reform, 29 B.C. L. REV. 531, 564-65 (1988) ("Strickland's impact on the ability of an ineffectively 
represented defendant to overturn the subsequent conviction is devastating."). 
70. Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., An Essay on the New Public Defenderfor the 21st Century, 58 LAW & 
CONTEMP. ROBS. 81,86-87 (Winter 1995). 
7 1. See Spangenberg & Beeman, supra note 66, at 3 1. 
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no more than put their names on a list. Neither experience nor qualifications 
beyond admission to the bar are reviewed and participation in training 
programs is not required. Recertification is not necessary. Competence is 
never reviewed. Membership lasts forever. Attorneys stop taking assignments 
when it suits them.72 Often, as in Texas, judges administer the plans and, 
without any standards or rules, choose which attorneys will be assigned to 
cases.73 As a result, tens of thousands of poor people in this country, 
particularly in rural counties, are represented by attorneys whose competence 
to handle cases-serious or minor-has never been subject to peer review and 
who are assigned to their clients by the judges who will 1) preside over the 
case; 2) pass on their requests for attorney fees; and 3) decide whether they 
will have access to investigators and experts.74 
In organized plans administered by an independent manager, rather than 
by the presiding judge, attorneys generally must meet specific skill and 
knowledge criteria to be assigned to certain types of cases.75 Administrators 
screen candidates, rotate assignments, and try to insulate attorneys from 
judicial influence and pressure. However, even in those plans, attorneys must 
seek court approval for expert andinvestigative services, as well as for their 
own fees.76 Busy calendar judges managing full dockets have an incentive to 
resolve cases, and the quickest resolution is generally a plea bargain. Judges 
are often less than generous in permitting the hire of investigative services for 
cases that they have a strong interest in resolving quickly, or in approving fees 
72. InNew YorkCity in the mid-1990's, the Presiding Judgeof the AppellateDivision First Judicial 
Department (with jurisdiction over the Bronx and Manhattan) required all Assigned Counsel Plan lawyers 
qualified to handle felony cases to re-apply to the panel. The re-certification process, which took over five 
years and required thousands of hours of volunteer attorney time, eliminated approximately 200 (10%) of 
the plan lawyers-presumably those who were the least qualified. As far as I know, this remains the only 
such effort to re-evaluate assigned counsel plan lawyers subsequent to their acceptance onto a panel. 
Interview with Norman Reimer, Esq., chair of thqAssigned Counsel Screening Committee during the re- 
application process. 
73. ALLAN K. BUTCHER & MICHAEL K. MOORE, MUTING GIDEON'S TRUMPET: THE CRISIS IN 
INDIGENTCRIMINALDEFENSE ~NTEXAS, available at http://uta.edu/pols/moordindigentllast.d (Sept. 22, 
2000); TEXAS APPLESEED FAIR DEFENSE PROJECT, THE FAIR DEFENSE REPORT: FINDINGS AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS OF INDIGENT DEFENSE PRACTICES I N  TEXAS, avai lable  at  
http://www.appleseeds.net~tx/Fair_DefenseRptFindingsand%2ORommendations.pdf (Dec. 2000); 
Moore, supra note 53, at 1635-36 (reporting that, in Texas, judges appoint lawyers even to capital cases 
based on 'subjective criteria' such as friendship or political support). 
74. See BUTCHER &MOORE, supra note 73. 
75. Pauline Houlden & Steven Balkin, Quality and Cost Comparisons of Private Bar Indigent 
Defense Systems: Contract vs. Ordered Assigned Counsel, 76 J. CRIM. L. &CRIMINOLOGY 176, 177-78 
(1985). 
76. See, e.g., ASSIGNED COUNSEL REPORT, supra note 47. 
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necessitated by time spent conducting legal research that the judge may 
believe is unnece~sary.~~ Attorneys themselves are sometimes hesitant to push 
aggressively for services on behalf of a client who will likely end up pleading 
guilty once the pre-trial work has been completed. No one wants to look as 
though he or she is wasting time and money. The attorney is caught between 
obligations to the court and to the client. When the client is not paying, and 
may be morally unattractive, emotionally or mentally disabled, and 
uncooperative, it is hardly surprising that an assigned attorney would feel a 
keen desire to please the court to which he or she returns each day. This 
tension creates a powerful conflict for the assigned counsel who may fear that 
mounting a zealous defense will endanger regular  appointment^.^^ 
Independence and zealous advocacy can be c~mpromised.~~ 
Moreover, assigned counsel plan lawyers are frequently paid at rates so 
low that only lawyers who are beginning their practice or those who were 
previously unsuccessful in the business of law will agree to take 
 assignment^.'^ In New YorkCity, lawyers who accepted court appointed, non- 
capital, criminal cases in the state courts in 2001 were paid at the rate of 
twenty-five dollars for an hour of out-of-court time and forty dollars for an 
hour of in-court time-less than they would have been paid in Alabama for the 
same work.8' The low rates force attorneys, who make their living through 
77. See BUTCHER &MOORE, supra note 73. 
78. See id. 
79. Dripps, supra note53, at 252-54 (describing the pressure on publically funded defenders as dual: 
horizontal pressure caused by the incentive to dispose of some cases in order to have more time for others; 
vertical pressure caused by the incentive to please the funding source). 
80. ASSIGNED COUNSEL REPORT, supra note 47, "Inasmuch as the current assigned counsel rates 
do not even meet law practice overhead costs in many areas of [New York State], it is no surprise that 
attorneys are either removing their names from assigned counsel panels, remaining on the panels but 
refusing to take assignments, or showing no interest in involving themselves in assigned counsel work at 
all," id. at 9; Albert L. Vreeland, 11, The Breath of the Unfee'd Lawyer: Statutory Fee Limitations and 
Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Capital Litigation, 90 MICH. L. REV. 626,643 (1991) ('The appointed 
counsel system has been roundly criticized for its failure to attract qualified counsel and its reliance on 
younger, inexperienced attorneys. . . ."). 
81. N.Y. COUNTY L. ART. 18-B increased the fees to twenty-five dollars and forty dollars in 1986; 
see also THE SPANGENBERG GROUP, RATES OF COMPENSATION PAID TO COURT APPO~NTED COUNSEL 
NON-CAPITALFELONY CASES ATTRIAL: A STATE-BY-STATE OVERVIEW (Oct. 1997) (noting that Alabama 
pays fifty dollars per hour for in-court work and thirty dollars per hour for out-of-court work). Since 1986 
in New York City where rates for assigned counsel in criminal and family court cases have been frozen for 
sixteen years at the punishingly low rate of twenty-five dollars an hour for out-of-court and forty dollars for 
in-court counsel time, the courts are rebelling. As family court lawyers increasingly refuse to take on new 
matters at those rates, some family court judges have unilaterally decided to pay attorneys seventy-five 
dollars an hour, despite the statute. See, e.g., Anthony S. v. Patricia S. (Fam. Ct. Dutchess County), 
published in N.Y. L.J., Feb. 1, 2001, at 32 (implying that the statutory limit is inadequate). 
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assigned cases, to accept a large volume of cases, to limit out-of-court time 
(preparing motions, conducting investigations, and researching the law), and 
to minimize expenses-responses antithetical to effective representation.". 
Assigned counsel plans that underpay drive the most conscientious lawyers 
away from indigent defense 
In addition to. low hourly rates, many state or county assigned counsel 
systems reimburse no more than a maximum number of hours-even on 
capital cases.84 The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, for example, limits 
lawyers to one hundred fifty hours on a capital case--despite the fact that a 
local state bar association committee found that it takes between four hundred 
and nine hundred hours of time to prepare such cases adeq~ate ly .~~  
B. Fixed Price Contract Providers 
The greatest problems with inadequate defense counsel are created by 
low-bid fixed-price contracts where a law firm agrees to accept all 
Zssignments arising in a given jurisdiction, over a set period of time, at a fixed 
price. Attractive to governments concerned with containing costs and 
accurately predicting expenditures, fixed-price contracts risk reduced quality 
provided to defendants, especially when contracts are awarded through 
competitive bidding. Death penalty lawyer Stephen Bright has noted that, 
"[mlany jurisdictions process the maximum number of cases at the lowest 
possible cost without regard to justice."86 He describes one particularly 
striking example of low-bid contracting that occurred in McDuffie County, 
Georgia. In that county, the county commission hired attorney Bill Wheeler, 
whose $25,000 bid for the year was almost $20,000 lower than the next 
closest contender, to handle all local criminal cases in the county.87 After four 
82. Vreeland, supra note 80, at 644-45. See also Michael McConville &Chester Mirsky, Criminal 
Defense of the Poor in New York, 15 N.Y.U. REV. L. &SOC. CHANGE 581,696-902 (1986-87) (discussing 
the practices of appointed counsel and comparing these practices with those of the Legal Aid Society). 
83. Victoria Rivkin, 18-B: A System Overloaded-Experts Say Lack of Respect, Low Pay Cause 
Exodus in System for Assigning Counsel, N.Y. L.J., June 15,2000, at 1 .  
84. N.Y. COUNTY L. ART. 18-B, 8 722-b. The caps set by statute in New York are $1,200 for a 
felony, $800 for a non-felony and $2,400 for a capital case. These limitations may be exceeded upon a 
showing of extraordinary circumstances. Id. 
85. Bright, supra note 4, at 807. 
86. Id. at 788. 
87. Id. 
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years of contract service, Wheeler tried only three cases and filed only three 
motions, but entered 3 13 guilty pleas.88 
C. Public Defense Offices 
Public defender programs have the best chance of delivering adequate 
services. "When adequately funded and staffed, defender organizations 
employing full-time personnel are capable of providing excellent defense 
 service^."'^ Generally, a public defender is a public or private not-for-profit 
organization staffed by attorneys whose exclusive responsibility is handling 
criminal cases. In large public defender offices, attorneys are trained, 
supervised, and supported by investigators, paralegals and clerical staff. The 
attorneys develop considerable e~pertise.~' 
However, no matter how effective the structure, inadequate funding 
adversely affects all defense  system^.^' When budgets are tight, defense 
organizations make difficult decisions about how to spend their funds?2 Staff 
vacancies are not filled and caseloads rise. Social workers and investigatoi-s 
shoulder too many assignments and spend insufficient time working with 
individual clients. Everyone on staff selects among individuals represented 
by the office and compromises on services. Lawyers are compelled to spend 
more time in court, answering calendar calls on behalf of their greater number 
of clients, and less time in the field or in the 1ibra1-y.'~ Lawyers who carry too 
many cases inevitably pressure clients to plead g~i l ty . '~  Crucial decisions in 
cases are made on the basis of too little fact in~estigation.~' 
88. Id. at 789. 
89. ABA, CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS COMMITTEE, STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: 
PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES, at Commentary to Standard 5-1.2. (3d ed. 1992). 
90. See Ogletree, supra note 70, at 85. 
91. See generally Spangenberg & Beeman, supra note 66 (noting that inadequate funding results 
in excessive caseloads and inexperienced counsel). 
92. William J. Stuntz, The Uneasy Relationship Between Criminal Procedure and Criminal Justice, 
107 YALE L.J. 1,35-44 (1997). 
93. In New York City, the Indigent Defense Organization Oversight Committee, a committee of the 
Supreme Court of the State of New York, Appellate Division, First Department, with the responsibility to 
evaluate defense services provided by the providers other than the assigned counsel program (discussed in 
detail infra at note 265 and accompanying text) found in its Report for 1997 that a reduction in funding 
caused the Legal Aid Society in New York City to ''handle too many cases with too little staff' and that 
"clients are not receiving the services they deserve." INDIGENT DEFENSE ORGANIZATION OVERSIGHT 
C O M M ~ E ,  Report for 1997, 17 (1998) (available from the Appellate Division, First Department). 
94. Klein, supra note 4, at 672-73. 
95. Id. (reporting that a study of the plea bargaining process in Boston discovered that the 
Massachusetts Defender Committee depends on plea bargaining to avoid trials which the office would be 
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Lack of funding for the defense function is certainly the single greatest 
factor adversely affecting quality.96 Nonetheless, responding to the perceived 
anti-crime attitude of the voting public, state legislatures have skimped on 
financial support for the defen~e.~' Efforts to convince legislators to spend 
more on defense have been remarkably unsuccessful." 8 some localities 
defense attorneys have tried to enlist other participants in the criminal justice 
system--departments of correction, prosecutors and court administrators-to 
assist in pressing the case for increased funding to local  legislator^.^^ 8 
others, defenders have urged the creation of special commissions to study and 
make recommendations to the state legislators. loo Groups of defense lawyers, 
unable to provide and that the larger the area served by the agency, the more excessive the caseloads). As 
attorney caseloads increase, so do guilty plea rates. Id. Ih 2000 in New York City, Assigned Counsel 
Lawyers handled 177,965 new defendants in the Bronx and Manhattan, 124,177 of those cases were 
disposed of at the first appearanc-most by a plea of guilty entered after no more than a ten-minute 
consultation with their lawyers. REPORTOFTHE ASSIGNEDCOUNSELPLAN ADMINISTRATORFORTHEFIRST 
DEPARTMENT FOR FISCAL YEAR I998 (on file with the author). 
96. See generally Douglas W.  Vick, Poorhouse Justice: Undeended Indigent Defense Services 
andArbitrary Death Sentences, 43 BUFF. L. REV. 329 (1995) (discussing the responsibilities of appointed 
attorneys, the problem of underfunding these defense systems, and the death penalty). 
97. COLE, supra note 1; Stuntz, supra note 92, at 4 ("As courts have raised the cost of criminal 
investigation and prosecution, legislatures have sought out devices to reduce those costs. Severe limits on 
defense funding are the most obvious example, but not the only one."). See generally Dripps, supra note 
1 (discussing the proposition that legislatures generally prefer limited restrictions on law enforcement 
mechanisms). 
98. As mentioned earlier, supra note 81, in New York State assigned counsel rates have not been 
increased since 1986 despite yearly lobbying efforts. In 1999, for example, the New York State League of 
Women Voters and the New York State Defenders Association, a not-for-profit organization that provides 
research, training and technical support for defenders, sponsored a series of hearings on the stateof criminal 
defense services in an unsuccessful attempt to convince the state legislature to raise the assigned counsel 
rates for family and criminal court cases. Each year a group of lawyers from across the state travel to the 
state capital in an effort to raise fees. So far there has been no action. John Caher, Coalition of Lawyers 
Protests Low Assigned Counsel Fees, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 15, 2000, at 1, col. 3. 
99. The Federal Deprutment of Justice has heavily supported these efforts to improve services 
through collaboration. The Department of Justice has sponsored two symposia on indigent defense where 
representatives of defender organizations, prosecutorial agencies and members of the courts were paid to 
travel to Washington D.C. and work together in small teams envisioning ways to improve the quality of 
defense services. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Indigent Defense-Publications-Paper and Otherwise, 
available at http://www.ojp.gov (last visited Nov. 13, 2001). 
100. Cf. The Spangenberg Group, 2000 State Legislative Scorecard: Developments Affecting 
Indigent Defense, THE SPANGENBERG EPORT, Nov. 2000, at 6, 15 (reporting that 
[i]n January 2000, the 25-member [sic] West Virginia Task Force recommended to the Governor 
and Legislature that the budget for West Virginia Public Defender Services (PDS) be increased for 
the specific purposes of: increasing salaries of PDS staff to competitive levels; hiring qualified 
management-information systems staff; and operating an auditing division, resource center and 
appellate division as required by [local] statute). 
Earlier, the Group reported that the North Carolina General Assembly enacted the Indigent Services Act 
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both those assigned individually to cases and those employed by defense 
organizations, have attempted collective action to raise salaries and improve 
working conditions through strikes.I0l 
Additional pro bono service provided by volunteer lawyers might relieve 
some of the pressures on public defense,lo2 but ethical obligations are 
inadequate incentive for the private bar to contribute much in time or money 
toward criminal defenses. Better training, monitoring, and evaluation of 
defenders and defense systems will make a difference, but without additional 
resources, only to a limited degree. 
m. JURISDICTION: USING THE SIXTH AMENDMENT O REFORM THE 
QUALITY OF SERVICES PROVIDED BY INSTITUTIONAL DEFENDERS 
Legal challenges to the constitutionality of services supplied by 
institutional criminal defense providers or assigned counsel plans have arisen 
in two ways. On the one hand, lawyers have confronted fee structures and 
assignment systems that require them to work for free or nearly so.Io3 These 
lawsuits have been more successful in protecting lawyers than in improving 
lawyering services for clients. They are worth reviewing because it was in 
this context that the courts found their inherent power to participate in the 
administration of public defense services. 
On the other hand, defendants, public defenders, bar associations, and law 
reform organizations have attacked delivery systems for their allegedly 
unconstitutional deprivation of defendants' Sixth Amendment right to 
counsel.'04 There are only a handful of these decisions. Not every court 
of 2000, which creates an independent agency in the state's judicial department to oversee and improve the 
quality of defense services in that state. The Spangenberg Group, North Carolina Legislature Gives Green 
Light to New Statewide Indigent Defense Program, THE SPANGENBERG EPORT, Aug. 2000, at 11, 11- 13. 
101. James S. Kunen, No Justice for These Lawyers, N.Y. TIMES, Sunday, Oct. 8, 1994, at A2. See 
Frances A. McMoms, Giuliani's Hard Line Breaks Strike at New York City Legal Services, WALL ST. J., 
Oct. 6, 1994, at B11. See also FIT v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493 U.S. 41 1 (1990) (where 
a group of attorneys who routinely represented indigent defendants refused to do so until the District of 
Columbia increased their compensation for such work). 
102. See David Rohde, Victory in Schools Suit Spotlights Need for Free Legal Work, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 22,2001, at B3. 
103. See discussion infra Part III.A.1. 
104. Lf lobbying, public education campaigns, and efforts at collaboration fail to raise funds for the 
defense function, litigation should be considered. Although funding and managing a complicated 
constitutional claim can be daunting, a lawsuit has the potential to trigger change in a number of ways, even 
pre-trial. Filing alone may generate publicity that educates the public and legislators. See, e.g., Michael 
A Riccardi, Second Lawsuit ChallengesRule 18-B Fee Schedule, N.Y. L.J., Feb. 22,2000, at 1 (discussing 
a New York lawsuit challenging the compensation system for attorneys representing indigent defendants). 
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confronted with a challenge to an overburdened public defense system has 
agreed to construe a local statutory scheme for providing services.lo5 The 
litigation presents a number of difficulties-both legal and political. 
First, federal abstention doctrineIo6 has forced litigation into state courts 
which are more reticent policy-makers than federal  court^.'^' Further, the 
complexity of the issues and the breadth of potential solutions disincline 
courts from undertaking problem-solving on a large scale.'08 
Second, courts may have been dissuaded from taking action by the 
unacknowledged but pervasive belief that anyone who has been arrested is 
guilty-a belief which inevitably minimizes the significance of all else in the 
criminal justice system besides the swift resolution of cases. The presumption 
of guilt is a "core belief shared by virtually all personnel who work within the 
criminal justice system"lo9 and a major hindrance to improving criminal 
defense services.l1° If judges suspect that everyone arrested is guilty, it is hard 
to convince them to strike as unconstitutional state-funded criminal defense 
systems that rush pleas or discourage legal research and creative investigation. 
Judges are not likely to order the expenditure of funds to hire lawyers and 
support staff when convinced of guilt and worried that additional support will 
only slow the process of adjudication not change results. Further, if judges 
If the claim can survive a motion to dismiss, the state or county responsible for administering the plan may 
decide to settle on favorable terms. That was the effect of litigation in Connecticut and Allegheny County, 
Pennsylvania. See generally Rivera v. Rowland, No. CV 9505456299, 1996 WL 636475 (Conn. Super. 
Ct. Oct. 23, 1996) (denying defendants' motion to dismiss). 
105. See generally Kennedy v. Carlson, 544 N.W.2d 1 (Minn. 1996) (see discussion infra at Section 
III.B.2). 
106. See, e.g., Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971) (explaining the reluctance of federal courts to 
issue injunctions regarding proceedings pending in state court) (see discussion infra at Section lII.B.4). 
107. Whether elected or appointed, state court judges are naturally more sensitive to the approval of 
politicians and the voting public than are federal judges who hold life tenure. 
108. Student Note, The Courts' Inherent Power to Compel Legislative Funding of Judicial 
Functions, 81 MICH. L. REV. 1687 (1983) (noting that because the Constitution allocates the power to 
appropriate public funds to the legislature, courts hesitate to invoke the inherent power doctrine to compel 
appropriations, even for the purposes of funding judicial operations). 
109. Daniel Givelber, Meaningless Acquittals, Meaningful Convictions: Do We Reliably Acquit the 
Innocent?, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1317, 1329 (1997). 
110. See David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1729, 1741 (1993) 
(arguing that the presumption of guilt can be ascribed to the attractive, although frequently misguided, 
conviction that police only arrest guilty people; even though the public will happily speculate about the 
accuracy of a police investigation in a particular case, especially when the details of the case are highly 
publicized and familiar, people generally believe that police arrest the guilty. "These predispositions can 
be ascribed to several . . . causes: the basic feeling that where there's smoke, there's fire. . . ; [gratitude 
to the police for protection against crime]; . . . obedience to authority and the well-known 'belief in a just 
world. . . ."'). Id. (footnote omitted). 
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focus exclusively on essentially ministerial closing of cases, it will continue 
to be difficult to move them to care about sentencing, diversion or 
rehabilitation - all of which require attention and time. 
The presumption of guilt helps to explain why the Supreme Court 
formulated an almost insurmountable standard of review for ineffective 
assistance claims on appeal. In Strickland v. ~ashington,"' the Court held 
that "[tlhe benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be 
whether counsel's conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the 
adversarial process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just 
res~lt ." ' '~ In other words, egregiously negligent work will be excused if the 
reviewing court is not convinced that a better effort would have produced a 
different result.' l 3  
The problem with the Strickland standard was captured by Justice 
Marshall in dissent: 
[I]t is often very difficult to tell whether a defendant convicted after a trial in which he 
was ineffectively represented would have fared better if his lawyer had been competent. 
Seemingly impregnable cases can sometimes be dismantled by good defense counsel. 
On the basis of a cold record, it may be impossible for a reviewing court confidently to 
ascertain how the government's evidence and arguments would have stood up against 
rebuttal and cross-examination by a shrewd, well-prepared lawyer.'14 
The Strickland majority opinion overlooks the simple fact that the 
prosecutor's evidence will always appear unassailable when counsel for the 
accused neglects to conduct an investigation or fails to challenge the state's 
version of the case. Ultimately, the decision deprives persons, against whom 
the prosecution has collected persuasive evidence--even if that evidence is 
misleading--of the right to effective assistance of counsel.' l 5  
Now that the explicit effects of inadequate lawyering have been 
highlighted by research and media attention, courts should be less willing to 
blindly ignore the ineffectiveness of the lawyers who appear before them116 
11 1. 466 U.S. 668 (1984). 
112. Id. at 686. 
113. See Richard Klein, The Constitutionalization of Ineffective Assistance of Counsel, 58 MD. L. 
REV. 1433, 1445-52 (1999) (discussing how the Strickland decision excuses the most excruciatingly 
deficient representation by characterizing mistakes and omissions as tactics). 
114. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 710. 
1 15. William S. Geimer, A Decade of Strickland's Tin Horn: Doctrinal and Practical Undermining 
of the Right to Counsel, 4 WM. &MARY BILL RTS. J. 91,93 (1995). 
116. See, e.g., Burdine v. Johnson, 231 F.3d 950,964 (5th Cir. 2000) (holding that despite the fact 
that a lawyer slept through substantial portions of prosecution witness testimony in a capital murder trial, 
the court could not presume constitutional ineffective assistance under Strickland). 
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and motivated instead to improve the delivery of services. Existing doctrine 
grounds judicial action. 
A. Fee Litigation-Adequate Attorney's Fees 
1. Fifh Amendment Rights of Counsel 
Until the 1960s, state courts compelled attorneys to represent indigent 
clients without compensation, as an obligation incidental to the privilege of 
practicing law.'" As the task of representing the criminally accused grew, 
assigned counsel began to argue that assignment without compensation was 
a "taking" of private property for public use, a violation of due process, and 
a denial of equal protection."' The "takings" cases provided a gateway for 
court involvement in assuring quality defense services for the poor. Courts 
that might have hesitated to intervene on behalf of defendants were willing to 
assist the lawyers who practiced before them. 
Beginning around 1965, perhaps in response to the changes wrought by 
the Gideon1I9 decision and the Warren Court's focus on the importance of 
individual rights,Iz0 lower courts began to listen to the "takings" arguments. 
That year the Supreme Court of New Jersey declared that members of the bar 
should not be required to absorb the full cost of defending the poor.I2' New 
Jersey pointed out that the burden of criminal assignments had increased, not 
only in number, but also in complexity.~22 As a result, the Court held that 
taxpayers should share in the cost of representing the indigent. Fees paid for 
assigned counsel work could be lower than market rate, but would "reimburse 
117. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 187 A.2d 761 (Pa. 1963). There, the Court appointed counsel to 
represent an indigent defendant on trial for murder. Id. at 761. After conviction, the trial judge directed 
payment of $500, the maximum allowable under state law, to counsel. Id. The conviction was appealed; 
the court ordered a new trial, but mid-way through the new trial, the defendant pled guilty. Id. at 761-62. 
Counsel applied for additional fees, but the request was rejected. Id. at 762. Although the court agreed that 
the $500 fee was inadequate for the services rendered, it held that the power to fix compensation was a 
legislative prerogative. Id. at 762-63. 
1 18. Vreeland, supra note 80. 
119. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). 
120. See generally ROBERTG. MCCU)SKEY,THE AMERICAN SUPREMECOURT 148-73 (2d ed. 1994) 
(discussing Court decisions regarding civil rights, freedom of speech, protection of criminal defendants, 
gender and equal protection). McCloskey noted that the Warren Court selectively incorporated "most of 
the criminal-procedure provisions of the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth Amendment as a limit on the 
states." Id. at 158. 
121. State v. Rush, 217 A.2d 441,448 (N.J. 1966). 
122. Id. 
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assigned counsel for his overhead and yield something toward his own 
supp~r t . " l~~  
In 1976, the West Virginia Supreme Court agreed that requiring attorneys 
to represent the indigent could be an unconstitutional "taking."'24 The Court 
held that when an attorney has so many appointments that it interferes with his 
ability to "engage in the remunerative practice of law," or that the costs 
associated with such defenses substantially "reduce the attorney's net income 
. . . the requirements must be considered confiscatory and unc~nstitutional."~~~ 
By 1987, the majority of courts were conceding that the cost of 
representing the indigent should be shared between the public and the bar.Iz6 
But once state courts reached consensus that attorneys must be paid fairly to 
represent the indigent-something less than market value but something more 
than a 'confiscatory' rate-the fee litigation strategy faltered as a mechanism 
for prompting change. Arguments addressing the rights of attorneys to be free 
from compelled and uncompensated labor could not be refocused to assert the 
rights of the accused to effective counsel. 
Litigation in Kansas illustrates the difficulty with the fee litigation 
strategy. In Stephan v. Orville J .  Cole, an experienced trial lawyer, 
was appointed to represent three separate indigent defendants in their 
individual criminal ~ases . "~  Shortly thereafter, he petitioned the appointing 
court to relieve him because the maximum permitted compensation was' 
insufficient to cover even his minimum office costs, and because he feared 
that inadequate compensation would affect his ability to provide effective 
123. Id. at 448. 
124. State ex re[. Partain v. Oakley, 227 S.E.2d 314, 319 (W. Va. 1976). 
125. Id. at 319. 
126. See DeLisio v. Alaska, 740 P.2d 437 (Alaska 1987). There, the attorney appointed to represent 
the defendant in a child sexual abuse case refused to proceed, arguing lack of competency to handle a 
criminal case, and that requiring him to represent the defendant without "reasonable compensation" 
constituted "a taking of private property for public use." Id. at 438-39. On appeal from the contempt 
citation, the Supreme Court of Alaska reversed. Id. The court rejected the competency argument, but held 
that an attorney cannot be forced to represent a client for free as a condition of his license to practice law. 
Id. See also People v. Johnson, 417 N.E.2d 1062 (Ill. App. Ct. 1981) (holding that the trial court abused 
its discretion by awarding the court-appointed attorney less than eight dollars per hour); Hulse v. Wifvat, 
306 N.W.2d 707 (Iowa 1981) (eliminating fixed fees and allowing courts to compensate attorneys for 
reasonable and necessary time); State v. Boyken, 637 P.2d 1193 (Mont. 1981) (holding that awarding fees 
lower than overhead costs constituted an abuse of discretion); State ex rel. Scott v. Roper, 688 S.W.2d 757 
(Mo. 1985) (holding that a court cannot require an attorney to represent a client without compensation). 
127. 747 P.2d 816 (Kan. 1987). 
128. Id. at 821. 
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representation.Iz9 He recognized that the rate of compensation created a 
conflict between his needs and those of his client.130 
The local trial court consolidated the case with another similar assigned 
counsel matter and held evidentiary hearings.13' At the close of the hearings, 
the court filed an order establishing new rules and panels for indigent defense 
services, in addition to requiring that counsel be paid reasonably.I3' To 
implement the ruling, the court declared any person not represented by an 
assigned counsel within thirty days would be presumed to have received 
ineffective assistance of counsel-a rebuttable pres~mption. '~~ On 
interlocutory appeal, however, the Supreme Court narrowed the scope of the 
ruling, striking the Kansas compensation scheme on quite different grounds, 
as unconstitutionally impacting on Kansas attorneys' equal protection rights, 
and held only that "[tlhe indigent defendant has a right to competent counsel 
. . . [but] has no right to adequately paid counsel. . . 
2. Fee-Capping & Judicial Discretion 
State statutes setting inflexible maximum assigned counsel fees have been 
successfully challenged as unconstitutionally limiting the power of the 
judiciary to administer justice. Such challenges seemed unlikely in 1963 
when at least one court was unwilling to award an additional fee to a lawyer 
129. Id. 
130. Id. at 821. A number of fairly recent state court decisions have addressed the questions of 
whether financial stress caused by low assigned counsel fees creates a conflict between the attorney and the 
client sufficient to require reversal of a conviction. See discussion infra Part III.A.3. 
131. Stephan, 747 P.2d at 821-22. 
132. The court heldthat reasonable compensation who sixty-eight dollars-the amount then necessary 
to cover office expenses in Kansas at the time. Id. at 822. 
133. Id. 
If reasonable compensation is not available for an attorney and does not become so available within 
30 [sic] days after a defendant is determined to be indigent and effective assistance of counsel is 
not available to such indigent defendant at the end of such period, the charges against such 
defendant shall be dismissed without prejudice. 
The trial court further created a list of attorneys qualified to serve on the assigned counsel plan. Id. 
134. Id. at 833. When Cole was appointed to this case, Kansas had three ways of providing counsel 
to the indigent. Id. at 845. Some counties had public defender programs; some had voluntary assigned 
counsel plans; and still others had mandatory assigned counsel plans. Id. Not surprisingly, the attorneys 
who were conscripted into service were unhappy. Id. The Kansas Supreme Court held that the plan was 
unconstitutional because it affected different groups of attorneys differently, violating the attorneys' equal 
protection rights. Id. at 846. Furthermore, it set aside those portions of the lower court orders which 
defined reasonable compensation in dollar amounts as well as those which mandated dismissal of charges 
unless compensation were provided. Id. at 850. 
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who tried a murder case for the second time.135 But within fifteen years, as the 
number of lawyers specializing in criminal practice grew along with the 
number of criminal cases, attitudes had radically changed. Judges were 
willing to disapprove those state statutes that directly circumscribed their 
discretion by capping fees at a set maxima or by failing to provide an override 
mechanism for the exceptionally lengthy or difficult case.136 
In these decisions, courts recognized, at least implicitly, that low fees and 
arbitrary maximum expenditures adversely affect the representation afforded 
to indigents. In Florida, for example, attorney Robert Makemson was 
appointed to represent one of four co-defendants charged with the kidnaping 
and murder of a member of a "prominent local family."137 Prosecutors threw 
enormous resources into the trial. "Three prosecutors and two special 
investigators sat at the counsel table, and over one hundred witnesses and fifty 
depositions were involved in the trial."138 Mr. Makemson was on his own. In 
addition, to avoid the extensive and prejudicial pre-trial publicity, he 
successfully moved for a change of venue and thus was forced to try the case 
inconveniently far from home and 0 f f i ~ e . I ~ ~  At the close of the case, 
Mr. Makemson requested a fee of $9,500.140 He was paid the statutory 
maximum-$2,000. 14' 
135. In Commonwealth v. Johnson, 187 A.2d 761 (Pa. 1963). counsel was assigned to defend an 
indigent defendant charged with murder. Johnson, 187 A.2d at 761. After the conviction, the trial judge 
awarded the attorney the $500 per case maximum fee allowable under the state statute. Id. The conviction, 
however, did not dampen counsel's enthusiasm. He kept on litigating, filing post-conviction motions, and 
arguing the appeal. Id. at 761. Ultimately, on retrial, the judge found the defendant guilty of second-degree 
murder. Id. at 762. Understandably, counsel asked for another $500 fee after the second trial, but the trial 
judge refused the request. Id. 
136. Smith v. State, 394 A.2d 834,838 (N.H. 1978) (noting that 
[Wlhat constitutes reasonable compensation for performedservices is, and has historically been, 
a matter for judicial determination. Moreover, it is peculiarly within the judicial province to 
ascertain reasonable compensation when the person who performs the services is acting under court 
appointment as an officer of the court. We view it implicit in the constitutional scheme that the 
courts of this State have the exclusive authority to determine the reasonableness of compensation 
for court-appointed counsel. The statute, in question intrude upon this judicial function in violation 
of the constitutional separation of powers mandate. 
(internal citations omitted) 
137. Makemson v. Martin County, 491 So. 2d 1109, 11 11 (Fla. 1986). 
138. Id. 
139. Id. 
140. Id. Experts actually testified that the value of his work was closer to $25,000. Id. 
141. The trial court was not able to coerce an attorney to handle the appeal even for $2,000. The trial 
court had to put the appeal assignment out to bid and ultimately accepted the low bid of $4,500, despite 
Florida statutes's limit of $2,000. Id. 
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Makemson challenged the fee limits and the trial court held: 
[Tlhis court is confronted with conflicting laws, one of which requires competent counsel 
for a defendant who has been sentenced to death and the other stating that defense 
counsel can be paid only $2,000 for his services . . . . One of these laws must yield to the 
other. There is no doubt in the court's mind that the Legislature, if confronted with the 
problem, would admit that the law requiring competent counsel was paramount and 
superior to the law allowing a mere $2,000 fee for the dreadful responsibility involved 
in trylng to save a man from electrocution. Therefore this court finds that [the statute] 
in setting rigid maximum fees without regard to the circumstances in each case is 
arbitrary and capricious and violates the due process clause of the United States and 
Florida Constitutions. In simpler language, the Statute is impractical and won't work.142 
The Florida Supreme Court affirmed, finding the statute unconstitutionally 
limited the power of the judiciary to administer justice and protect the rights 
of the accused:'43 "[wle must focus upon the criminal defendant whose rights 
are often forgotten in the heat of this bitter dispute. In order to safeguard that 
individual's rights, it is our duty to firmly and unhesitatingly resolve any 
conflicts between the treasury and fundamental constitutional rights in favor 
of the latter."144 
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma took an even broader appr0a~h.I~~ In 
1989, two attorneys appointed to represent Delbert Lynch on a capital murder 
charge succeeded in convincing the jury to sentence Mr. Lynch to life. 
Counsel requested fees well in excess of the statutory maximum of $3,200.146 
The trial court approved the request, holding the fee cap uncon~titutional.~~~ 
On appeal the Oklahoma Supreme Court affirmed and went even further. 
Relying on the judiciary's "direct and inherent constitutional power to 
regulate the practice of law,"'48 the Court made a finding which substantially 
changed the assigned counsel system in 0klah0rna.l~~ 
In that state, attorneys in counties without public defender offices could 
be involuntarily conscripted into service.'50 In counties with public defenders, 
the need for assigned counsel was much less acute and attorneys were not 
142. Id. (quoting Martin County v. Makemson, 464 So. 2d 1281, 1287 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) 
(Anstead, C.J., dissenting)). 
143. Makemson, 491 So. 2d at 1 1  12. 
144. Id. at 1113. 
145. State v. Lynch, 796 P.2d 1150 (Okla. 1990). 
146. Id. at 1153-54. 
147. Id. at 1154. 
148. Id. at 1162. 
149. Id. at 1159-60. 
150. Id. at 1159. 
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forced to accept  assignment^.'^^ The Oklahoma Court declared the disparity 
in the treatment of assigned counsel to be unconstitutional,~52 encouraged the 
creation of voluntary pools of attorneys to end the practice of involuntary 
assignment,Is3 ordered the establishment of a statewide pay scale, held that 
"[iln order to place the counsel for the defense on an equal footing with 
counsel for the prosecution, provision must be made for compensation of 
defense counsel's reasonable overhead and out of pocket  expense^,"'^^ and, 
finally, reaffirmed the trial court's power to award extraordinary fees when 
appropriate.lSs Reacting to the ruling, the Oklahoma legislature created an 
Indigent Defense Board that organized a state-wide plan for the provision of 
indigent defense services and raised assigned counsel rates.ls6 
Thus, litigation begun narrowly as a challenge to a restrictive payment 
scheme generated far-reaching change. In condemning statutes that limited 
judicial discretion, courts in Oklahoma, Florida and New HampshirelS7 
asserted their power to ensure criminal defendants' Sixth Amendment rights 
in the face of legislative inactivity. 
3. Fee Caps as Creating a Conflict of Interest 
Defense attorneys have argued that low fees and maximum awards 
engender a unresolvable conflict between counsel and client that necessarily 
adversely affects the quality of representation and requires reversal of a 
conviction. This argument builds upon precedent requiring reversal of a 
conviction where counsel was either completely denied at a critical stage in 
the criminal proceeding or was not removed from the case despite a clear 
conflict of interest.Is8 In those situations, prejudice is presumed. 
151. Id. 
152. Id. at 1163. 
153. Id. at 1159-60. 
154. Id. at 1161. 
155. See id. at 1161-62. See also Bye v. Dist. Court County of Larimore, 701 P.2d 56, 60 (Colo. 
1985) (holding that the 'judicial branch of government possesses the inherent power to determine and 
compel payment of those sums of money which are reasonable and necessary to carry out its mandated 
responsibilities'). 
156. OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, 8 1355-1370 (West Supp. 2001). 
157. Smith v. State, supra note 136. 
158. United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 659 (1984) (holding that a young and inexperienced 
attorney who was given only three weeks to prepare for a technically complex and lengthy mail fraud trial 
was not per se ineffective). The Court held that there are circumstances "so likely to prejudice the accused 
that the cost of litigating their effect in a particular case is unjustified." Id. at 658. See, e.g., Powell v. 
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932) (arguing that representation was ineffective where one attorney was appointed 
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This strategy has not been successful.159 Although courts understand the 
tension between economic self-interest and zealous advocacy, they are not 
persuaded that such routine and pervasive conflict undermines the reliability 
of a verdict or even affects attorney performance. Without explicitly 
distinguishing between an economic conflict and other more obviously 
prejudicial conflicts (such as when one attorney represents multiple clients 
with intersecting and incompatible defenses), no court has held that an 
economic conflict compels reversal unless, just as in the typical post- 
conviction ineffective assistance of counsel claim, there has been actual injury 
to the defendant. '60 
When counsel agreed to represent Christopher Bacon, an escapee from 
a local Vermont correctional facility, on a murder charge at the assigned rate 
of twenty-five dollars an hour, the attorney was unaware of the case's full 
complexity.I6' During discovery, counsel realized that the prosecution 
intended to call an expert to testify to a DNA match between the murder 
victim's blood and blood stains found on the defendant's vest and jeans.162 
Counsel asked for permission to withdraw from the case and moved for 
dismissal of the charges.163 He claimed that the low fees coupled with the 
amount of preparation time required created an unresolvable conflict between 
his client and himself.'64 The request was denied.165 Meanwhile, counsel was 
to represent an entire group of innocent, falsely accused young men); Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 
(1978) (reversing a conviction because the (rial court failed to inquire into the conflict). 
159. See State v. Bacon, 658 A.2d 54 (Vt. 1995). 
160. Id.; Webb v. Commonwealth of Virginia, 528 S.E.2d 138 (Va. Ct. App. 2000). 
161. Bacon, 658 A.2d at 66. 
162. Id. at 67. 
163. Id. at 66. 
164. See id. 
165. Id. at 67. As my colleague Professor Vanessa Merton has noted 
The reported opinions on ineffective assistance are replete with examples of lawyers pleading with 
trial judges, fruitlessly, to be relieved from criminal defense appointments because the lawyers knew 
that they were or would be in stark violation of DR 6-101(A)(1). . . . See, e.g., Aldrich v. 
Wainwright, 777 F.2d 630,633 (1 Ith Cir. 1985) (holding that continuance will not be granted even 
though counsel stated that he was 'totally unprepared' and not in a position to provide competent 
legal representation; as a result, defendant convicted and sentenced to death); Dillon v. Duckworth, 
751 F.2d 895,897 (7th Cir. 1984) (upholding conviction and death sentence of defendant despite 
trial court's denial of defense lawyer's request for continuance of murder trial because of his 
inability to prepare due to three major life crises-his father's heart surgery, his brother's paralysis, 
and his own divorce-in the preceding three months; counsel had been ordered to proceed even 
though he had spent less than four hours with defendant); United States v. Ruiz, 533 F.2d 939, 
939-40 (5th Cir. 1976) (refusing to grant continuance or withdrawal even though counsel had been 
arrested on an extradition warrant during trial, and had requested continuance after release because 
he was in 'emotional shamble' and could not proceed); United States v. Ploeger, 428 F.2d 1204, 
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unable to find a DNA expert willing to consult on the case for the fee that the 
assigned counsel administrator was willing to pay.'66 In the end, he failed to 
contest the admissibility of the DNA evidence, or to cross-examine the state's 
DNA experts, or to call any expert witnesses of his own. Instead, he sat 
quietly while the evidence was intr~duced. '~~ 
One of the grounds for Bacon's appeal was ineffective assistance of 
counsel. He contended that the "State's failure to pay [his counsel] in a timely 
manner for expenses and services . . . created a conflict of interest by forcing 
counsel to choose between his family's financial welfare and his loyalty to his 
client, thereby denying defendant effective assistance of counsel."'68 
Although the Vermont Supreme Court implicitly accepted the premise 
that low attorney fees could create a valid conflict, it nonetheless refused to 
reverse Bacon's con~ic t ion . '~~  
There was no evidence that trial counsel neglected this case or  that he was forced, out of 
financial necessity, to spend less time on this case than he should have spent. He made 
no attempt to show specifically how the State's failure to pay him in a timely manner 
limited his preparation of his client's defense. 
In short, the Court found that trial counsel and his witnesses had simply 
attacked, in a general way, the state system for compensating assigned 
1205 (6th Cir. 1970) (upholding conviction and twenty-year sentence of defendant after one-day 
trial, although lawyer had been ordered to trial on his first day of appearance in the case, and had 
told the judge that he had never seen the indictment, investigated, nor prepared the case); Wood v. 
Superior Court, 690 P.2d 1225 (1984). overruled in part on other grounds, DeLisio v. Alaska 
Superior Court, 740 P.2d 437 (Alaska 1987); see also Stem v. County Court, 773 P.2d 1074,1080 
(Colo. 1989) (holding that an attorney appointed to represent a criminal defendant who believes that 
he or she is incompetent to handle the case bears the burden of proving that incompetence to the 
court); State v. Wilson, 687 P.2d 800, 802-03 (Or. Ct. App. 1984) (denying defense counsel's 
request to withdraw form the case, despite his contention that he could not adequately defend his 
client because he was intimidated by the trial judge); In re J. R. C., 593 S.W.2d 124, 124-25 (Tex. 
App. 1979) (finding that lower court properly denied counsel's request to withdraw due to his lack 
of experience and familiarity with criminal trials); cf. Easley v. State, 334 So. 2d 630, 632 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (granting on reconsideration an initial denial of motion to withdraw in felony 
case, but holding lawyer in contempt and fining him $500 for informing defendant that he felt 
incompetent to provide representation). See generally Annotation, Ineffective Assistance of 
Counsel: Right of Attorney to Withdraw, as Appointed Defense Counsel, Due to Self-Avowed 
Incompetence, 16 A.L.R.5th 118 (1993 & Supp. 2000). 
Vanessa Merton, What Do You Do When You Meet a "Walking Violation of the Sixth Amendment" if 
You're Trying to Put That Lawyer's Client in Jail?, 69 FORDHAM L. REV. 997, 1027-28 n.83 (2000). 
166. State v. Bacon, 658 A.2d 54.67 (Vt. 1995). 
167. Id. 
168. Id. at 66. 
169. Id. at.67-69. 
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counsel, rather than establishing that the purported conflict had a concrete 
effect on this particular defendant This was insufficient to meet defendant's 
burden. 170 
The economic conflict cases raise a valid issue. It is virtually impossible 
for an underpaid assigned counsel or contract lawyer to work as diligently for 
an assigned client as that lawyer might fike or as the facts might warrant. The 
poorly paid lawyer will inevitably tend to complete work on assigned criminal 
cases as quickly as possible. The more time an assigned case takes, the less 
time the lawyer has for a better paying client, or even for additional assigned 
matters. 
The conflict is real. Even the most diligent lawyers struggle with it every 
day as they try to make a living and zealously advocate for their clients. ' . 
However, if the issue is raised by an individual attorney during the pendency 
of a particular assignment, it will be resolved pre-trial either by the trial court 
substituting one lawyer for another-with uncertain benefit for the client, or 
by an award of extraordinary fees for the individual attorney-with no 
beneficial effect for other, similarly situated, attorneys or their clients. If the 
economic conflict is raised post-conviction as a challenge to the reliability of 
a particular conviction, it will be measured by the post-conviction Strickland 
ineffectiveness standard,17' requiring a showing of specific prejudice, and is 
thus unlikely to succeed. 
B. Systemic Litigation-Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel 
Overall, fee litigation has been only moderately successful in improving 
the delivery of defense services to the poor. The approach has inherent 
limitations. First, the cases focus primarily on the interests of lawyers to be 
compensated fairly-rather than on the rights of indigent defendants to 
170. Id. at 68. See also State v. Taylor, 947 P.2d 681 (Utah 1997). There, Von Lester Taylor raised 
a similar economic argument to the Utah assigned counsel system in 1997, after his attorney gave a closing 
argument which contained no logical arguments and failed to ask the jury for mercy. Id. at 688. Although 
the Court found that "[o]verall, Levine did not give a virtuoso performance," id., that poor compensation 
attracts poor attorneys, and that poorly paid attorneys fail to spend the time needed to prepare a case, id. 
at n.2, the Court could find no support in the record for the purported conflict. Id. at 690. Levine had not 
requested additional funds at any time, nor had he asked for assistance, or to be relieved from the case. See 
id. at 688. Moreover, appellate counsel did not explain the casual relationship between low assigned 
counsel fees and Mr. Levine's poor performance. See id. Accord Webb v. Commonwealth, 528 S.E.2d 
138, 142-45 (Va. App. 2000) (holding that Virginia's rate of pay, then lower than any other state's, did not 
cause a conflict of interest for assigned counsel). 
171. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,687 (1984). See discussion supra notes 50 and 110 
and accompanying text. 
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effective assistance of counsel. Furthermore, fee litigation is simply too 
restrictive an approach to generate far-reaching change. Even if a challenge 
is successful in raising fees, a decision in a fee litigation case generally does 
nbt address the other problems that frequently exist in an assigned counsel 
plan: lack of supervision; lack of independence of counsel; and the absence 
of appointment standards, training, or support services. Although individual 
courts have leveraged requests for additional fees into opportunities to revamp 
entire indigent defense delivery systems,'72 typically courts resolve the cases 
and controversies before them with narrow and specific rulings. Lf a lawyer 
requests additional fees or a higher rate of pay, courts will limit the relief 
granted to that request. Thus fee litigation addresses only a single facet of the 
complex arrangement for providing criminal defense services. 
The more effective strategy is to mount a systemic Sixth Amendment 
challenge to a jurisdiction's mechanism for providing criminal defense 
services.'73 A systemic challenge can address a broad range of issues; it can 
focus on the rights of defendants, not their lawyers and can analyze the quality 
of representation provided to the entire class of individuals who receive 
criminal defense services, rather than just the services provided in one 
particular trial. Further, the approach can trigger broad remedies-injunctive 
or declaratory relief with the potential to prompt legislative re~p0nse . l~~  
Systemic litigation is difficult, however. Success is not assured. Careful 
planning and preparation are essential. The following ingredients are 
necessary: egregious conditions (in other words-a real crisis), allegations of 
actual injury to clients, litigation support from a law reform organization or 
bar association, and public favor. 
172. See, e.g., State v. Lynch, 796 P.2d 1150 (Okla. 1990) (changing the operation of the judgment 
defense system in Oklahoma based on the judiciary's constitutional right to regulate the law). 
173. A number of commentators have made this same point. See Richard J. Wilson, Litigative 
Approaches to Enforcing the Right to Effective Assistance of Counsel in Criminal Cases, 14 N.Y.U. REV. 
L. &Soc. CHANGE 203,216-17 (1986); Margaret H. kmos ,  Note, Civil Challenges to the Use ofLow-Bid 
Contracts forlndigent Defense, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1808 (2000); Note, Gideon's Promise Unfulfilled: The 
Needfor Litigated Reform of Indigent Defense, 113 HARV. L. REV. 2062 (2000). See generally Robert A. 
Schapiro, The Legislative Injunction: A Remedy for Unconstitutional Legislative Inaction, 99 YALE L.J. 
231 (1989) (arguing that courts should be able to create "legislation" in the school desegregation context). 
174. This is exactly what happened in Arizona and Louisiana. See Stookey & Hammond, infra'note 
184 (discussing State v. Smith, 705 P.2d 1376 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985)); Calogero, infra note 196 (discussing 
State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d. 780 (La. 1993)). See also Doyle v. Allegheny County Salary Board, No. 
GD-96-13606 (Pa. Ct. C. P. filed 1997); Rivera v. Rowland, No. CV 9505456298. 1996 WL 636475 
(Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 23, 1996) (where a settlement added fifty-four new permanent positions to the 
Connecticut public defender office over a two-year period along with a five million dollar budget increase 
over the same period). See infra Part III.B. 
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I .  Egregious Conditions 
When a county provides criminal defense services to clients by 
contracting out the work to the lowest bidder without regard for qualifications 
or track record, conditions are ripe for litigation. In Mohave, Arizona, law 
f m s  submitted sealed bids for the indigent criminal work. 175 The presiding 
judge opened the bids and summarized the information in a cover letter to the 
County Board of  supervisor^.'^^ The judge made no effort to distinguish 
among bidding law firms on the basis of experience, ability, or reliability 
although it would have been possible to do so.177 Each year the Board simply 
accepted the bids of the lowest bidders-xcept for one year when it rejected 
the bid of an attorney who had been held in contempt for failing to file a 
brief.178 
The chosen fm would be paid what was bid no matter how many or what 
type of cases arose in the contract year; no matter how much time or expertise 
those cases required; and regardless of the staff attorneys' experience 1 e ~ e l . l ~ ~  
There was no limit to the number of cases any one attorney might be 
assigned.laO Contracting attorneys were required to pay for the services of 
investigators or experts needed in the preparation of the case. Moreover, they 
were permitted to have a private practice in addition to their contract work. 18' 
Represented at trial by a Mohave contract attorney, Joe Smith alleged on 
appeal that his Sixth Amendment right to counsel had been violated by the 
contract defense system. Although the court refused to reverse Smith's 
conviction for ineffective assistance of counsel, finding that his individual 
representation had been adequate,182 the court's ruling-in effect a declaratory 




179. See id. 
180. See id. 
181. See id. 
' 182. Id. at 1378,138 1. Nevertheless, the court did reverse Smith's cbnviction because Smith hadn't 
been permitted to call an alibi witness. He was convicted again after remand. State v. Smith, 705 P.2d 
1376 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1985). 
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judgment creating a inference of inadequate repre~entation'~~-nded the use 
of low bid contracts in M 0 h a ~ e . l ~ ~  
Rick Tessier, a public defender in New Orleans, labored under conditions 
similar to those experienced by the Arizona contract In 1991 
Tessier was assigned to represent Leonard Peart on rape, robbery and murder 
charges, while he was simultaneously responsible for about seventy other 
felony matters in a New Orleans Parish court. On every available date, 
Tessier was scheduled to begin the trial of a different client. Completely 
overwhelmed, Tessier asked for help. He petitioned for support services, 
explaining that he was handling far too many cases and unable to provide 
adequate assistance to any of his clients. The trial court responded positively, 
finding that Tessier's working conditions were so extreme as to prevent him 
from providing reasonably effective assistance of c0unse1.l~~ 
The court found the entire public defense system in the city of New 
Orleans to be unconstitutional "because it does not provide adequate funding 
for indigent defense and because it places the burden of funding indigent 
defense on the city of New or lean^."'^^ The judge's ruling required 
reductions in Tessier's caseload and suggested that the legislature set aside 
funding to acquire a library for the defender organization, hire an investigator, 
and ensure support services.189 Further, to reduce the public defender docket, 
the judge promised to assign future indigent criminal cases to members of the 
local bar who were not on any assigned counsel list or plan and who may not 
have been accustomed to providing indigent criminal defense services.'90 
Ultimately, on appeal, the Louisiana Supreme Court agreed with two of 
the trial court's most important findings, while rejecting many of its more 
specific directions.191 The Louisiana Supreme Court concurred that 
183. Smith, 681 P.2d at 1383 (holding prospectively that representation by a contract attorney would 
raise an inference of inadequate representation of counsel). In fact the court said that the county system 
was the "least desirable and can result in inadequate representation by counsel." Id. at 1383. 
184. See John A. Stookey & Larry A. Hammond, Rethinking Arizona's System of Indigent 
Representation, Ariz. Att'y, Oct. 1996, at 28.30 (reporting that the maximum allowable caseloads set by 
the Supreme Court of Arizona in Smith were subsequently adhered to by all contract attorneys, and that a 
subsequent case in Yoma County, Zarabia v. Bradshaw, 912 P.2d 5 (Ariz. 1996). sparked the creation of 
a public defender system in the county). 
185. See State v. Peart, 621 So. 2d 780 (La. 1993). 
186. Id. at 784. 
187. Id. at 784-85. 
188. Id. at 784. 
189. Id. at 784-85. 
190. Id. at 785. 
191. Id. at 786-92. The Supreme Court limited its ruling to Section E, a single city district, and, more 
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ineffective assistance of counsel could be determined ~ r e - t r i a l ' ~ ~  and
acknowledged that excessive caseloads could result in constitutionally 
inadequate assistance of c0unse1.l~~ "Many indigent defendants in Section E 
are provided with counsel who can perform only pro forma, especially at early 
stages of the proceedings. They are often subsequently provided with counsel 
who are so overburdened as to be effectively ~nqualified."'~~ 
The Louisiana Supreme Court's ruling-that any defendant tried in 
Section E would be presumed to have been ineffectively represented so long 
as the legislature did not take steps to reduce the workload and improve 
conditions for the public defendersI9'-prompted the legislature to increase 
the budget for the public defenders by five million dollars in the next 
legislative session.'96 
2. Allegations of Actual Injury 
Conditions do not have to sink to the obviously nightmarish levels of 
Mohave County, Arizona, or the Section E Parish in New Orleans, before a 
systemic Sixth Amendment challenge can be mounted against a particular 
arrangement for providing criminal defense services. However, in the absence 
of shockingly egregious conditions, a lawsuit must establish-at a 
minimum-that the services provided are causing actual injury to clients. 
Actual injury can be established through a combination of anecdotal and 
empirical evidence.I9' But without the facts to convincingly prove harm to the 
system's clients-whether juveniles, adults in family court, or criminal 
defendants--courts will reject complaints as not justiciable. 
The failure to precisely detail how high caseloads hurt clients undermined 
Sixth Amendment litigation in Minnesota. There, in 1992, the Chief Public 
Defender filed a lawsuit in the local district asking for declaratory relief and 
alleging that the Minnesota funding system for public defense violated the 
importantly, refused to implement any of the expert recommendations that the trial court had adopted. Id. 
at 788-92. 
192. Id. at 787. 
193. Id. at 790. 
194. Id. at 789. 
195. Id. at 791. 
196. Chief Justice Pascal F. Calogero, Jr., The State of Indigent Defense in Louisiana, 42 LA. B .  J. 
454,457-58 (1995) (reporting that as a result of the decision, a statewide task force was established by 
executive order. Task force recommendations resulted in the creation of a statewide defender board). 
197. See discussion infra Part III.B.2.c (demonstrating actual injury through various kinds of 
evidence). 
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Sixth Amendment rights of the public defender's ~1 ien t s . l~~  At that time, the 
public defense system in Minnesota was supervised by the State Board of 
Public Defense. As part of its monitoring function, the Board adopted 
caseload standards for the public defenders. Chief Public Defender Kennedy 
argued that constant under-funding forced his staff to handle caseloads far in 
excess of the standards adopted by the Board, "and that this overburdening . . . 
impaired the rights of his indigent clients and threatened to cause systemic 
professional rnisc~nduct."'~~ 
Kennedy set out the claim in accurate but general terms, reporting that 
since his staff of defenders could not refuse new clients, they were forced to 
enter quick pleas on behalf of some clients in order to be available for others 
and were unable to spend sufficient time with any of them."' No individual 
clients signed affidavits testifying to the adverse effects of public defender 
representation on them."' No lawyers accepted responsibility for errors 
resulting from' too much work and too little On appeal from initial 
success, the Court of Appeals held that Kennedy's "claims of constitutional 
violations [were] too speculative and hypothetical to support jurisdiction in 
this pointing out that, 
[tlhe district court did not find that Kennedy's staff had provided ineffective assistance 
to any particular client, nor did it find that Kennedy faced professional liability as a result 
of his office's substandard services. Nor do any of Kennedy's clients join him in 
attacking the statutory funding scheme at issue here by presenting evidence of inadequate 
assistance in particular cases.204 
Because the public defender was unable or unwilling to expose specific 
errors or omissions, the court found the claim of across-the-board 
ineffectiveness illusory and spe~ulative.~'~ The fact that the caseloads of the 
public defenders violated accepted standards was not persuasive, standing 
alone. The allegation that the general working conditions would eventually 
cause injury to clients was insufficient. The court would not act without proof 
that the violation actually caused injury to clients.'06 
198. Kennedy v. Carlson, 544 N.W.2d 1, 3 (Minn. 1996). 
199. Id. at 4. 
200. Id. at 6 .  
201. Id. at 8. 
202. See id. 
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i a. Litigation Support 
The lesson to be learned from the failure of the Minnesota litigation is 
that a public defender understandably will resist revealing how its own staff 
is causing or has caused injury to clients. The office would have to publicly 
admit error-a task that is unpleasant, bad for staff morale, and potentially 
damaging to its credibility with the public. The Minnesota litigation might 
have been more successful if it had been brought by a different plaintiff. If a 
bar association or a civil rights organization, perhaps on behalf of named 
plaintiffs, brought the suit it could have detailed frankly the injuries to the 
public defender's clients. 
In fact, this strategy has been successfully used by the American Civil 
Liberties Union ("ACLU) to improve the quality of representation provided 
to indigent defendants in several jurisdictions. In Connecticut, for example, 
the ACLU and its local affiliate, the Connecticut Civil Liberties Union 
("CCLU"), on behalf of named plaintiffs (clients of the Connecticut public 
defender), challenged the state indigent defense system (naming the public 
defender as a defendant); they asserted that public defender caseloads had 
increased over the years while the number of defenders had remained static 
and that resources for the defenders had failed to keep pace with the increased 
number of cases.207 As an outside observer, the ACLU was in a better position 
to objectively assess the public defenders' practice, exploring exactly how that 
practice, compromised by excessive workload, minimized the opportunities 
for clients to defend themselves. 
The second amended class action complaint in the Connecticut lawsuit 
describes the enormous caseloads shouldered by the public defenders-three 
times higher than the recommendations of the National Advisory Commission 
of Criminal Justice Standards and Goals. The complaint further details the 
lack of social work services, the absence of library support or computers for 
research and word processing, the dearth of trials or other fact-finding 
proceedings; and, most importantly, the complaint charges that those 
inadequacies were causing harm to current clients.208 
207. Rivera v. Rowland, No. CV 9505456298, 1996 WL 636475, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 23, 
1996). 
208. Id. The complaint further referenced the annual public defender testimony in the state legislature 
requesting additional funds and a well-respected study of the Connecticut government which criticized the 
operation and funding of the defender office, and compared it unfavorably to other state defender programs. 
The defendants' Motion to Dismiss for Lack of Subject Matter Jurisdiction was denied by Superior Court 
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The lawsuit was withdrawn after the governor and the public defender 
agreed to a settlement and successfully lobbied the legislature for additional 
funding for the ~ffice.'"~ That funding permitted a substantial number of new 
hires and raised the fees for private attorneys accepting those indigent cases 
that the public defender is unable to handle. The terms of the settlement 
require the public defender to oversee the conflict counsel, draft practice 
standards, and install and operate a case management ~ystem.~" 
The ACLU brought a similar challenge to the quality of services provided 
by public defenders in Allegheny County, Penn~ylvania.~" In addition, 
litigation supported by the ACLU and the Arnold & Porter law firm is pending 
in Mis~issippi."~ In New York City, the New York County Lawyers' 
Association ("NYCLA") is challenging low assigned counsel fees.'I3 NYCLA 
is able to present a more honest picture of the quality of representation than 
could individual Assigned Counsel Plan attorneys. 
6. Standing 
Law reform organizations suing on their own behalf-rather than in the 
name of individual clientslplaintiffs-may draw a challenge to the 
organization's standing. NYCLA's current litigation, challenging the low 
assigned counsel fees paid to those attorneys who accept family and criminal 
Judge Lavine. 
209. Rivera v. Rowland, No. CV 95545629S, 1996 WL 636475, at *7 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 23, 
1996). 
210. Rivera v. Rowland, No. CV 950545629s. 1996 WL636475 (Conn. Super. Ct. Oct. 23,1996); 
Joint Motion forApprova1 of Withdrawal of Action (dated July 2, 1999). See generally Recorder's Court 
Bar Ass'n v. Wayne County Court. 503 N.W.2d 885 (Mich. 1993) (involving a consortium of bar 
associations challenged judge-made local rules for the assignment of counsel that would have established 
set fees for every case regardless of whether the case was disposed of by plea or by trial). The Supreme 
Court of Michigan appointed a special master to hold hearings and gather information on defense services. 
Id. at 887. Noting that the system had the dubiously "meritorious effect of speeding up the docket," the 
master found that a fixed fee system encourages assigned counsel to persuade their clients to plead guilty. 
Id. at 887-88. "'[Uf a lawyer is not paid to spend more time with and for the client, [there is an incentive] 
to put in as little time as possible for the pay allowed . . . . Essential motions are neglected."' Id. at 888. 
The services of expert witnesses were never available to the indigent clients unless their assigned counsel 
lawyers supplemented the public funds out of their own pockets. Id. at 887 n.5. On the basis of those 
findings, the Supreme Court of Michigan held that the fixed-fee system failed to provide "reasonable 
compensation," and that "whatever the system or method [devised], the compensation actually paid must 
be reasonably related to the representational services that the individual attorneys actually perform." Id. 
at 895. 
21 1. Doyle v. Allegheny County Salary Board, No. GD-96-13606 (Pa. Ct. C.P. filed 1997). 
212. Quitman County v. Mississippi (CN. Action No. 99-0126). 
213. N.Y. County Lawyers Ass'n v. Pataki, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 22,2001, at 25 [hereinafter NYCLA]. 
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court assignments in Manhattan and the Bronx, alleges that the state's minimal 
assigned counsel fees and monetary cap provisions214 caused an exodus of 
lawyers from the plan and resulted in those lawyers who continue to accept 
assigned counsel matters to handle many more than they can effectively 
represent. Because New York City depends upon assigned counsel lawyers 
to represent a large percentage of the people arrested each dayY2l5 NYCLA 
claims that 
the State's failure to take measures to ensure adequate levels of compensation has placed 
the system of assigned counsel on the brink of collapse, creating an imminent threat of 
widespread due process and right to counsel violations, and allowed the F i s t  
Department's assigned counsel program to deteriorate to a point where it subjects 
children and indigent adults to a severe and unacceptable risk where meaningful and 
effective legal representation is no longer provided.216 
New York State challenged NYCLA's standing to assert the  claim^.^" 
In response, NYCLA pointed to its historic relationship to indigent criminal 
defense. NYCLA was one of the original signors and co-sponsors of New 
York City's plan for provision of criminal defense services to the indigent, 
contemplated by Article 18-b of the New York County ~ a w . ~ ' ~  Members of 
NYCLA sit on the Screening Committee which approves attorneys to handle 
assigned matters, handles complaints against those lawyers, and re-certifies 
them for continued Before resorting to litigation, NYCLA 
struggled for years to improve the quality of criminal defense services 
provided to the poor in the First Department of New York City through 
214. N.Y. County L. Art. 18-B 5 722-c (set in 1986 at $25 and $40 for in and out-of-court work). 
215. The Assigned Counsel Report does not ascribe an exact percentage to the number of cases 
handled by 18-B panel lawyers. The ACP Administrator's Report for 1998 reports that 18-B lawyers in the 
First Department represented a total of 177,965 defendants on homicide, felony and misdemeanors in the 
Bronx and Manhattan that year (on file with the Appellate Division, First Department). The Executive 
Summary of the Criminal Court of the City of New York reports that the total number of filings in 1998 
in those two boroughs was 213,206 (on file with Chief Administrator of the Criminal Court). It is unclear 
which of these number is the most reliable. It is clear, however, that New York City relies heavily on the 
18-B panel and that the low fees paid for 18-B work have dissuaded new lawyers from joining the panel 
and current panel members from taking new assignments. 
216. NYCLA, supra note 213, at 25 (see Complaint filed 2/18/00, on file with the author). 
217. Id. at 26. (See State's Motion to Dismiss on file with the author.) New York State moved to 
dismiss the claim on the grounds, among others, that the bar association did not have standing to sue, that 
the complaint failed to state a justiciable case or controversy against the governor, that the relief sought 
interfered with executive and legislative discretion not subject tojudicial review, and would requirean order. 
directing the expenditure of state funds. NYCLA, supra note 213, at 26. 
218. NYCLA, supra note 213. 
219. See N.Y. RULES OF COURT 5 612 Appendix A (McKinney 2001). 
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screening, re-certification, and training. Justice Lucindo Suarez, of the New 
York Supreme Court, Appellate Term, denied the motion to dismiss.220 
"[Tlhis court cannot ignore [the obvious fact] that if NYCLA is denied 
standing, it would exempt from judicial review the failure of the State to 
comply with its statutory and constitutional ~bligations."~~' 
c. Documenting Actual Injury: Voices of the Under-Represented 
Successful litigation depends upon bringing to the court the voices of the 
accused who are not being adequately represented. In its Allegheny County 
complaint, for example, the ACLU alerted the Court of Common Pleas to the 
serious deficiencies in public defense services caused by cuts to the public 
defender's budgeL2" AS background, the complaint described the lack of 
training for attorneys, the absence of investigators, social workers, clerical 
personnel, expert witnesses; the inadequate library facilities; the lack of 
written policies regarding ethical obligations to clients; and the total absence 
of any case management system.223 It explained how many cases the public 
defender was required to handle each year and compared that number to the 
nationally accepted caseload reco~nmendations.'~~ It contrasted the county 
expenditures on funding for the Allegheny public defender office with the 
much greater amount spent on the Allegheny prosecutor and compared the 
$2.9 million spent on public defense in Allegheny county unfavorably to 
expenditures of up to $13 million in other similarly sized counties in other 
parts of the co~ntry.''~ 
As a result of these and other inadequacies, the lawsuit claimed that 
public defender attorneys were unable to provide representation at 
arraignment; to counsel their clients between court appearances; to find and 
use transcripts of pre-trial hearings at trial; to investigate cases; to obtain 
expert assistance; or to file m~tions.''~ The complaint specifically 
documented how long some of the plaintiffs had been in jail without having 
their case investigated; how long others waited to confer with appointed 
220. NYCLA, supra note 213, at 25. 
221. Id. 
222. Plaintiffs Third Amended Class Action Complaint at 1-12, Doyle v. Allegheny County Salary 
Bd., No. GD-96-13606 (Pa. Ct. C.P. filed Dec. 1 ,  1997). 
223. Id. at 22. 
224. Id. at 20. 
225. Id. at 25-26. 
226. Id. at 26-30. 
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counsel; and how long still others, with documented histories of mental 
illness, waited for psychiatric e~aluation.'~' It included examples of cases 
where expert assistance should have been requested, but were not; of 
defendants shuttled between multiple lawyers none of whom knew what the 
others were doing; and of drug-addicted clients, who should have been 
considered for treatment or pre-trial diversion but were not.228 
NYCLA used a similar technique in its pending lawsuit. NYCLA 
combined anecdotal and statistical information which it brought to the court's 
attention in the initial complaint as well as in the brief and appendixes 
submitted in response to the State's motion to dismiss.229 In addition to 
studies and reports documenting the numbers of cases handled by the assigned 
counsel lawyers, the rapid disposition rate, and lack of trials or other fact- 
finding procedures, NYCLA also presented affidavits from assigned counsel 
attorneys who believed that they were at risk of rendering ineffective 
assistance of counsel because of their working  condition^.'^^ 
The New York Supreme Court rejected New York State's argument that 
NYCLA's claim was not j~sticiable.~~'  "The fact that this case may have 
political overtones, involve public policy, or possibly touch upon executive or 
legislative functions does not negate its justi~iability."~~~ The court was 
motivated by the stories of the adults and children whose lives were adversely 
affected by the challenged representation and by the indisputable evidence of 
inadequate representation presented through hard numbers. 
3. Public Support 
In addition to showing actual injury and egregious conditions, systemic 
litigation has a greater chance of success with media and public support. The 
NYLCA suit was filed after a flurry of newspaper articles documented the 
227. Id. at 2-1 1. 
228. Id. 
229. See NYCLA, supra note 21 3, at 26 (the brief and appendices include: the Annual Report of the 
Chief Administrator of the Courts (documenting the number of cases being processed in the family and 
criminal courts), a Report from the Center for Battered Women's Legal Services, Sanctuary for Families 
(discussing the effects of low fees on the ability of battered women to obtain adequate representation); New 
York Law Journal Articles (documenting the effects of lack of assigned counsel attorneys on clients), 
practice manuals (discussing standards of practice); empirical studies of family court; and reports from the 
assigned counsel administrator (materials on file with author). 
230. See id. 
23 1. Id. at 25-26 (rejecting the state's arguments for dismissal). 
232. Id. at 25. 
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unfortunate consequences of the legislature's failure to raise assigned counsel 
rates,233 and the publication of a report on the crisis in the Assigned Counsel 
system drafted by the two of the state's most influential administrative 
Litigation in Connecticut was heralded by a number of favorable 
editorials and feature stories, and bolstered by a respected study of 
effectiveness in the state government that criticized the state indigent criminal 
defense system.235 In Louisiana, just before Tessier initiated his dramatic 
action, a noted expert studied the conditions in the Parrish courts, bringing the 
inadequacies to the public's attenti0n.2~~ A number of these lawsuits have 
benefitted from pro bono assistance provided by major law firms. NYCLA's 
suit is being handled by Davis Polk & Wardwell in New York. Arnold & 
Porter is conducting litigation in Mississippi. 
4. Choice of Forum 
Federal courts have been prevented largely from engaging in the reform 
of state indigent defense systems by abstention doctrine. In Younger v. 
Harris, the Supreme Court held that federal courts should not interfere with 
the operation of local criminal prose~utions.2~~ Since then, federal courts have 
233. See, e.g., John.Caher, Chief Judge Announced Reforms: Judiciary to Move Ahead on 
Reorganizing Courts, Drug Laws 18-BRates, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 9,2001, at 1 (discussing thejudiciary'sreform 
proposals, especially regarding compensation for counsel assigned torepresent indigent defendants); Daniel 
Wise, Assigned Counsel Wins Case and HigherRates, N.Y. L.J., Jan. 18,2001 at 1, col. 4 (explaining that 
several judges had authorized pay for assigned counsel at rates greater than that set by statute in the face 
of legislative inertia); Robin Topping, Attorneys Protest Low Pay for Indigent Cases, NEWSDAY, Jan. 17, 
2001, at A3 1, available at 2001 W L  2912240 (interviewing Long Island assigned counsel lawyers who 
organized protests against the low rates of pay which they claim affects the quality of their practice). 
234. ASSIGNED COUNSEL REPORT, supra note 47. 
235. See, e.g., Editorial, Public Defenders are Overloaded, HARTFORD COURANT, Jan. 10, 1995, at 
A10, 1995 WL 53 18983; Lynne Tuohy, Constitutional Challenge Foreshadowed by OfJicial Reports, 
Court Rulings, HARTFORD COURANT, Jan. 6, 1995, at A14 (1995 WL 5315405); and CCLU Suits Lays 
Bare a Public Defender System in Crisis, HARTFORD~OURANT, Jan. 8, 1995, at A1, 1995 WL 5315612; 
Andrew Blum, Defense oflndigents: Crisis Spurs Lawsuits. Public Defender Say a Funding Squeeze Has 
All But Nullified the Right of the Poor to Counsel, NAT'L L.J., May 15, 1995, at Al, col. 2. 
236. See Calogero, supra note 196. 
237. Younger v. Hanis, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). See also O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488 (1974) 
(holding that criminal defendants who sued in federal court to stop illegal bond setting, sentencing, and j u j  
fee practices in criminal cases are barred from litigating in federal court by Younger v. Harris abstention 
doctrine); Gardner v. Luckey, 500 F.2d 712 (5th Cir. 1974) (denying relief for a claim that the Florida 
public defender systematically failed to meet minimum constitutional standards in the representation 
afforded indigents because the claimants' injury was too speculative, and because federal abstention 
doctrine prevents it further refused to intervention in state judicial processes); Noe v. County of Lake, 468 
F. Supp. 50 (N.D. Ind. 1978) (refusing to intervene in a claim alleging ineffective assistance of counsel and 
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generally refused to entertain constitutional challenges to the operation of any 
part of a state criminal justice system because, to do so, would necessarily 
affect criminal prosecutions.238 So, for example, when indigent defendants in 
Galveston, Texas, sued local officials in state court complaining that assigned 
counsel were ineffective; that bail was too often excessive; that grand jury 
proceedings were faulty; and that pleas were coerced, the Fifth Circuit Court 
of Appeals dismissed the suit because it believed that granting the necessary 
equitable relief would require excessive federal interference in the operation 
of state criminal 
Similarly, the Second Circuit quickly reversed a highly acclaimed 
decision of the Eastern District Court of New York which intervened to 
improve the quality of criminal defense services.240 Amid the success of the 
prison reform cases in the early 1970's, a class of indigent defendants 
compldined that their Legal Aid Society lawyers were too overburdened to 
provide adequate representati~n.~~' After lengthy hearings, the District Court 
agreed and ordered the Society to refrain from accepting additional cases until 
caseloads dropped to a manageable The Second Circuit reversed in 
aper curium decision holding that the Legal Aid Society was not acting under 
color of state law and that federal district courts have "no power to intervene 
in the internal procedures of the state courts."243 Thus, although it could be 
argued logically that ensuring constitutionally adequate defense services does 
not necessarily require judicial interference with any criminal conviction or 
restrain any prosecution,244 federal courts have not been persuaded and have, 
for the most part, removed themselves from the evaluation and reformation of 
state criminal justice systems.245 
conflict of interest). 
238. Tarter v. Hury, 646 F.2d 1010 (5th Cir. 1981). 
239. Id. 
240. Wallace v. Kern, 392 F. Supp. 834 (E.D.N.Y. 1973). rev'd, 481 F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1973). 
241. Id. at 835. 
242. Id. at 849. 
243. Wallace, 481 F.2d at 621. 
244. See LRmos, supra note 173 (making that argument in her very helpful student note). 
245. Federal courts will consider lengthy delays in perfecting a criminal appeal as a violation of due 
process. However, even when inordinate delays have been proved, the federal courts are reluctant to order 
systemic improvements as a remedy. Some courts have threatened release of appellants in the face of 
excessive delay. See, e.g., Harris v. Kuhlman, 601 F. Supp. 987 (E.D.N.Y. 1985) (holding that the failure 
of court-appointed counsel to perfect petitioner's appeal may violate due process and equal protection and 
that the state is responsible for those violations). At least one court has used allegations of wide-spread 
systemic appellate delay as an opportunity to take a look at the operations of the public defender. See 
Harris v. Champion, 938 F.2d 1062 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding that excessive delay in obtaining an appeal 
may constitute a due process violation and remanding for a hearing to determine whether the appellate 
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The only federal ruling with any precedential value in this area is the 
initial Eleventh Circuit decision in Luckey v. ~ a r r i s . ' ~ ~  Luckey was a civil 
rights action brought on behalf of all current and future criminal defendants 
and their counsel in Georgia. Plaintiffs alleged that "systemic deficiencies" 
in the Georgia defense system routinely deprived criminal defendants of their 
Sixth Amendment rights.247 The Court of Appeals found that "[tlhe sixth 
amendment protects rights that do not affect the outcome of a trial. Thus, 
deficiencies that do not meet the 'ineffectiveness' standard may nonetheless 
violate a defendant's rights under the sixth amendment."248 Conceding that 
the Strickland standard is inappropriate for a civil suit seeking prospective 
relief,249 the Court explicitly determined that claims of systemic 
ineffectiveness may be raised pre-trial so long as plaintiffs can establish 
"likelihood of substantial and immediate irreparable injury and the inadequacy 
of remedies at law."250 Although the Luckey complaint was eventually 
dismissed on abstention grounds, the Eleventh Circuit decision firmly 
established that defense services can be challenged prospectively. 
Appellants have alleged that systemic delays in the appointment of counsel deny 
them their sixth amendment right to the representation of counsel at critical stages 
in the criminal process, hamper the ability of their counsel to defend them, and 
effectively deny them their eighth and fourteenth amendment right to bail, that 
their attorneys are denied investigative and expert resources necessary to defend 
them effectively, that their attorneys are pressured by courts to hurry their case to 
trial or to enter a guilty plea, and that they are denied equal protection of the laws. 
Without passing on the merits of these allegations, we conclude that they are 
sufficient to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.251 
delays are systematic to the Oklahoma Public Defender's office). Most have held that the appropriate 
remedy for such violations is a civil rights action for damages. See. e.g., Simmons v. Reynolds, 898 F.2d 
865,869 (2d Cir. 1990) (denying release because the plaintiff eventually received an appeal); Williams v. 
James, 770 F. Supp. 103, 107 (W.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that incarceration was not unlawful where 
prisoner's appeal eventually was heard). 
246. Luckey v. Harris, 860 F.2d 1012 (1 1th Cir. 1988). The Eleventh Circuit affirmed the District 
Court's dismissal. 976 F.2d 673 (I lth Cir. 1992). 
247. Luckey, 860 F.2d at 1013. 
248. Id. at 1017. 
249. Id. 
250. Id. (citing to O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 502 (1974)). 
251. Id. at 1018. 
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IV. STANDARDS: THE INFORMATION NECESSARY FOR REFORM 
The successful settlements in Pennsylvania and Connecticut, NYCLA's 
preliminary victory in New York Supreme Court, and the favorable rulings in 
Lynch, Smith, and Peart, demonstrate that state courts will act to improve 
criminal defense services-if convinced that the working conditions of the 
defense bar are truly adversely affecting client representation. Finding horror 
stories or empirical evidence has not been the major obstacle for plaintiffs 
confronting systemic litigation. The major impediment has been the absence 
of an objective measuring tool to evaluate competence of counsel. 
Lacking standards that establish the number of cases a defender can 
reasonably be expected to handle, for example, courts cannot assess 
complaints of excessive caseloads and will rely on their own subjective sense 
of what is appropriate. A judge whose work before taking the bench was in 
a city prosecutor's office where assistants routinely handle a hundred cases ' 
each day might have thought Rick Tessier's workload was tolerable, or even 
average.252 A different judge with work experience in a law fm representing 
a well-to-do business clientele might have reacted differently. Judges cannot 
be expected to make such complex decisions with no more guidance than their 
individual sense of what is reasonable or manageable. Objective baselines 
establish what the profession believes is necessary and how far the system 
under scrutiny departs from accepted practice. 
Just as standards for the management of correctional institutions provided 
the guidance necessary for judicial prison reform in the 1960's, the 
development of standards for the administration of defense services furnish 
the information necessary for systemic reform of indigent defense services 
today. Fortunately, the defense community has been recently and 
energetically engaged in the process of drafting, adopting, and implementing 
standards intended to guide not simply the performance of individual 
attorneys, but also the operation of defense organizations and systems.253 
Three categories of standards are applicable to the defense function: 
eligibility standards, performance standards, and standards for the 
administration of delivery systems. Eligibility standards are used to evaluate 
whether an attorney has the requisite experience or credentials to take on a 
certain category of cases. In some death penalty states, for example, attorneys 
252. See State v. Lynch, 796 P.2d 1150 (Okla. 1990). 
253. See INST. FOR LAW AND JUSTICE, supra note 58 (collecting standards from across the country 
and publishing them electronically). 
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must enroll in specially tailored training classes and certify that they have 
tried a number of homicide cases before being approved for a death penalty 
case.254 
Performance standards are "intended to be used as a guide to professional 
conduct."255 The most complete set are the ABA Standards for Criminal 
Justice: Prosecution Function and Defense   unction,^^^ detailing case 
handling guidance for the individual attorney. To be useful for a wide range 
of defenders, private and public, the standards are couched in general terms; 
for example, one standard states that "[dlefense counsel should act with 
reasonable diligence and promptness in representing a ~lient.'"~' "Defense 
counsel should not carry a workload that, by reason of its excessive size, 
interferes with the rendering of quality representation. . . ."258 Another widely 
used set of performance standards are the National Legal Aid and Defender 
Association ("NLADA) Performance Guidelines for Criminal Defense 
Representation, which identify the various stages of a criminal case, from the 
initial interview through investigation, motion practice, trial preparation, and 
sentencing, and suggest how attorney should handle each stage-a model code 
of conduct for criminal defense 
However useful these performance standards may be for training 
purposes, or to inspire defense attorneys, they sometimes set unrealistic goals 
for handling routine minor criminal cases and can be too vague to be helpful 
in a serious investigation into the adequacy of defense services.260 For 
example, ABA standards suggest an attorney should "conduct a prompt 
investigation of the circumstances of the case and explore all avenues leading 
to facts relevant to the merits of the case and the penalty in the event of 
254. See, e.g., IND. R. CRIM. P. 24; OHIO SUP. R. 20 (Anderson 2001); KAN. ADMIN. REGS.; 
NEBRA~KACOMMISSIONOFPUBLIC ADVO ACY, STANDARDS FORINDIGENTDEFENSE SERVICESONCAPITAL 
AND NON-CAPITAL~ASES, STANDARD IU.For a complete list, see INST. FOR LAW AND JUSTICE, supra note 
58. 
255. ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: DEFENSE FUNCTION STANDARD 4- 1.1 (3d ed. 1993) 
[hereinafter DEFENSE FUNCTION STANDARD]. 
256. See id. 
257. Id. 4-1.3(a). 
258. Id. 4-1.3(e). 
259. NATIONALLEGAL AD AND DEFENDER ASSOCIATION, PERFORMANCEGUIDELINES FORCRIMINAL 
DEFENSE REPRESENTATION (1995) [hereinafter NLADA]. 
260. In fact, the drafters of performance standards have generally been careful to state that the 
standards are not to be used as criteria by courts in evaluating the performance of particular attorneys or 
in determining the validity of any specific conviction. See DEFENSEFUNCTIONSTANDARD, supra note 255, 
at 4-1.1 cmt. (''[qt is beyond the scope of these Standards to attempt to determine the conditions under 
which deviation from the recommendations made here warrants reversal or vacation of a conviction."). 
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conviction."261 To be sure, on a serious felony matter or even a contested 
minor crime, attorneys must investigate, and failure to investigate could be 
considered incompetence, malpractice, or ineffectiveness. 
Despite these admonitions, it is incontestible that investigations are rarely 
conducted into the tens of thousands of minor arrests processed in the criminal 
courts of our large Moreover, in most of those cases-arrests for 
possession of marijuana, trespassing, prostitution, driving without a license, 
or ~hopl i f t ing~~~4efendants  admit the charges and wish to resolve the 
situation as soon as possible, essentially eliminating the need for an 
investigation. Regardless of the realities of defense work, the routine lack of 
investigation into the vast majority of criminal charges would seem to violate 
ABA standards. In this and many other instances, practice is in constant 
conflict with performance standards.264 
Again, despite NLADA standards which provide, at the initial appearance 
on the charges, attorneys should "enter[] a plea of not guilty in all but the most 
extraordinary circumstances where a sound tactical reason exists for not doing 
so,"265 thousands of cases are disposed of at the initial appearance.266 Because 
261. Id. at 4-4.1. 
262. McConville & Mirsky, supra note 82, at 760-65. The authors found that Assigned Counsel 
Panel attorneys conducted investigations in only 27.2 percent of all homicide cases, in 12.2 percent of all 
other felony cases, and in only 7.8 percent of misdemeanor cases. Id. at 762. In addition to their failure 
to personally conduct investigations, Assigned Counsel Panel attorneys did not ask the courts to authorize 
the use of investigators to assist them. Id. at 763. 10.9 percent of the Assigned Counsel Attorneys never 
used an investigator on any case, 67.4 percent used them occasionally, and only 21.7 percent used 
investigators regularly. Id. at tbl. 6-3. 
263. See Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social Influence 
Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance Policing New York 
Style, 97 MICH. L. REV. 291,292-301 (1998) (describing the kinds of arrests-trespass, disorderly conduct, 
drinking a beer in public-which have become routine, the inordinate numbers of such arrests that are being 
made in New York City, and the disparate impact on minorities of the police policy of arresting people 
accused of misdemeanors). 
264. Scott Glover & Matt Lait, The Rampart Scandal; Parks Says Agencies Share Rampart Blame; 
Scandal: Prosecutors, Others, Missed 'Red Flags,' Chief Contends. Public Defender Rejects Call for . 
Self-critique, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 2,2000, at A1 . If defense attorneys are aware of the existence of the rules, 
the discontinuity has two possible effects. It can either cause the defense practitioners to feel that they are 
continually breaking the rules, or it can cause them to discount the significance of the rules. In either event, 
constantly breaking rules breeds apathy to rules and an inability to differentiate the occasions when the rule 
should be followed from those occasions when it can be ignored. The Ramparts Scandal in Los Angeles 
is a perfect example of the ultimate consequence of this syndrome. Hundreds of innocent individuals, 
framed by corrupt police, entered guilty pleas, on the advice of public defenders who did not believe their 
clients protestations of innocence and who conducted no investigation into the facts of the charges. Id. 
265. NLADA, supra note 60, at Guideline 3.1. 
266. CRIMINAL COURT OFTHE CITY OF NEW YORK, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (statistics for Jan. 2000, 
showing that of the total of 367,962 criminal filings in 1999, 197,022 were disposed of in arraignments) 
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performance standards, such as those drafted by the ABA and the NLADA, 
do not differentiate between the case where a plea should not be entered 
immediately and the one where a plea is appropriate, they provide little 
guidance either for lawyers who need to prioritize their work or for judges 
called upon to evaluate the adequacy of a defense services system that 
provides representation to thousands of people. In fact, the standards seem 
almost irrelevant to the inquiry. 
The third type of standard serves to guide the operation of defender plans 
or organizations. These "administration" standards address the functioning 
of systems rather than the performance of individual lawyers, focusing on 
management issues such as; whether the organization monitors the 
performance of its staff through supervision or other kinds of case 
management and control (including case and workload limits); whether it 
provides training or continuing legal education; and whether it supports staff 
by supplying ancillary investigative, social work and expert services, or 
adequate facilities. In short, administration standards look at whether the 
defense organization furnishes the ingredients essential to the functioning of 
a law firm providing criminal defense  service^.'^' Administration standards 
are easier to draft accurately than standards which purport to identify when 
and for which clients lawyering services ought to be employed. Everyone in 
the defense community can agree that a defense organization ought to provide 
investigators for its lawyers, that it should ensure sufficient word processing 
capability so that motions can be typed, or that it shouldlimit the number of 
cases its staff accepts--even though it is obviously impossible to identify, in 
the abstract, when an investigation should be conducted or when the defendant 
should exercise his right to testify, to give just two examples of the difficulty 
with performance standards.268 While performance standards must be vague 
enough to apply, to a multitude of situations, administration standards can be 
specific. Thus, administration standards are a better tool for the evaluation of 
systems than performance standards are for measuring the effectiveness of an 
individual attorney on an individual case.269 
(on file with the Chief Administrative Judge). 
267. Naturally, there is some overlap between the performance, qualification and administration 
standards. Administration standards generally include requirements that relate to attorney qualifications 
as well as some provisions (such as when an attorney should begin representation and the duration of that 
representation) which could be easily categorized within performance standards. 
268. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,688-89 ("No particular set for counsel's conduct 
can satisfactorily take account of the variety of circumstances faced by defense counsel or the range of 
legitimate decisions regarding how best to represent a criminal defendant."). 
269. Further, while the appropriate remedy for an individual attorney's failure to comply with 
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Administration standards have been tested as a tool for monitoring the 
effectiveness of defense systems. In New York City, the intermediate 
appellate court for the First Judicial Department (presiding over appeals from 
the Bronx and Manhattan) adopted rules establishing an Indigent Defense 
Organization Oversight Committee ("IDOOC") with the responsibility to 
evaluate and monitor the provision of defense services by organized providers 
in those TO carry out its task, IDOOC borrowed from the ABA 
accreditation process which measures law schools against a set of standards 
generated by the legal education community. First, with input and advice 
from the organizations subject to monitoring, IDOOC drafted detailed 
administration  standard^.'^' Then, each organization was asked to complete 
a self-study detailing its compliance with the standards. Finally, with the 
assistance of volunteer lawyers from local bar associations, IDOOC conducted 
site visits to confirm the information in the self-study. 
Analysis revealed most of the providers evaluated between 1996 and 1999 
were in compliance with the IDOOC Guidelines, although the process did 
reveal inadequacies and strengths in the defense providers.272 IDOOC reports 
its findings annually to the First Department. Although the Court could take 
performance standards might be the reversal of the client's conviction, the appropriate remedy for an 
organization's failure to comply with administration standards is systemic change. 
270. N.Y. RULES OFCOURT 5 613 (McKinney's 2001). In reaction to the decision of the Mayor of 
the City of New York to contract out portionsof the indigent defense work in New York City to new and 
untested law fums, the Supreme Court, Appellate Division, First Department enacted Court Rules which 
authorized the creation of an oversight committee to monitor and evaluate the provision of services by all 
contract providers in the First Department (the Bronx and New York County). Id. 
27 1. General Requirements for All Organizations Providing Defense Services to Indigent Defendants 
(1996) (promulgated pursuant to N.Y. RULES OF COURT at § 613.5, and available from the New York 
Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Fist Department), available at http://www.NYSDA.org/Defense- 
Servicesldefense-services.html. Since detailed standards are easier to use in monitoring than vague ones 
which could be open to multiple interpretations, IDOOC added specifics to its standards for the 
administration of defense services. The training standard, for example, includes sections discussing 
continuing legal education, trial advocacy training, as well as new attorney training. Id. The standards 
further require: a 1:10 supervisor to attorney ratio, periodic performance evaluations of staff by the 
supervisors, advertisement of opportunities for promotion, sufficient support services, and implementation 
of case management and quality control systems. Id. The most important IMXX3 standard is the limit on 
attorney caseloads-since no attorney can provide quality services to too many clients. To provide added 
incentive to meet the standards, IDOOC decided that failure to meet any one of the standards would create 
a rebuttable presumption that the organization as a whole was not providing quality services. Id. The 
burden would be on the organization to explain how it was providing quality representation despite the 
failure. Id. 
272. IDOOC has generated four reports: for the years 1996, 1997, 1998 and 1999. The repons 
generated media attention and perhaps influenced providers to make changes. Nothing in the Court Rules 
gives IWOC any power to enforce its findings. See N.Y. RULES OF COURT (McKinney 2001). 
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action to prevent assignment of cases to out-of-compliance organizations, thus 
far it has not. 
The New York Appellate Division's experience proves standards can be 
used by a monitoring body to evaluate the performance of a defender office. 
So long as the standards are drafted, or ratified in some way, by the relevant 
community subject to review, and if the monitoring body is seen to be non- 
political, fair, and knowledgeable, the results of the evaluation will be 
credible. Just as the development of correctional standards rendered the 
abstract notion of cruel and unusual punishment justiciable, so do 
administration standards translate the idea of effective assistance of counsel 
into a concrete form that can be used by a court. 
Three of the four elements which Feeley and Rubin characterize as 
prerequisites for judicial policy making are easily identifiable in the adequacy 
of counsel context.273 Crisis in the criminal justice system-in particular the 
recognition that innocent people are being convicted, that the death penalty is 
irrationally and unfairly imposed, and that many cases are rudimentarily 
handled-provide motivation. Courts can rely on a growing body of case law 
construing the Sixth Amendment to support intervention and guide decision- 
making. Moreover, standards designed to guide the administration of defense 
services provide a measure against which to consider challenged operations. 
273. See FEELEY & RUBIN, supra note 5, at 211-33. In a book review published in July, 1999, 
Professor Marc Miller disputes Feeley and Rubin's conclusion that judges frequently engage in policy 
making. Marc L. Miller, Wise Masters, 51 STAN. L. REV. 1751 (1999) (reviewing MALCOLM . FEELEY 
& EDWARD L. RUBLN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND THE MODERN STATE (1998)). TO Support his 
argument, Miller points to what he characterizes as the failure of courts to plunge into detailed, prolonged, 
and exacting reformation of indigent criminal defense systems. Recognizing that the iildigent criminal 
defense systems are appropriate for judicial intervention, he suggests that were Feeley and Rubin's premise 
true, morecourts would have already followed the lead of Pear?, Smith and Lynch. Id. at 1801-03. Instead, 
he asserts that, even subsequent to those decisions, courts presented with opportunities to improve criminal 
defense systems have ducked the challenge. Id. Thus, he concludes that state courts are more cautious 
policy makers than Feeley and Rubin would like us to believe. Id. at 1803-16. In this last conclusion he 
is undoubtably correct. State courts did not blaze into reformation of criminal defense systems once courts 
in Louisiana and Oklahoma began to show the way. The decisions did not snowball as rapidly as decisions 
reforming prisons in the wake of Talley. However, Miller exaggerates the lack of judicial activity in this 
area, and, as a result, his predictions are overly pessimistic. Miller points to Kennedy v. Carlson to 
illustrate judicial reluctance, but ignores the success of the Connecticut or Allegheny County litigation, and, 
of course, his article was published before the NYCLA suit was filed. 
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It is a bit more difficult, however, to detect a "coordinating idea" or theme to 
guide the application of standards to the system under scrutiny. 
Judge Henley was able to see corporeal punishment as a violation of the 
Eighth Amendment because he saw imprisonment differently than other 
judges. He conceived incarceration as having a purpose-rehabilitation. Of 
course, Judge Henley was not alone in his new vision. Prison officials 
themselves were re-conceptualizing their work. "[Tlhe rehabilitative ideal 
served as a major method of integration between their own role expectations 
and their personal attitudes. In many prison systems [rehabilitation was 
becoming] the 'party line,' the rationale that prison officials themselves would 
offer as the basis for their actions."274 Guards became correction officers, 
professionals who trained for their work, who were evaluated, disciplined, and 
promoted. 
Like the prison administrators of the past, today the indigent defense bar 
is undergoing its own re-as~essment.~'~ When I graduated from law school in 
1976, young attorneys gravitated to defense work for two reasons. First, they 
saw criminal defense, with its emphasis on rights jurisprudence, as a way to 
continue battling for civil r i g h t ~ ~ ~ ~ - - a n  opportunity to assist the 
274. FEELEY &RUBIN, supra note 5, at 260. As evidence for this proposition, Feeley and Rubin cite 
the American Correctional Association's 1959 version of the Manual of Correctional Standards. as well as 
a 1979 Correctional Association survey, in which "prison administrators in Illinois consistently favored 
rehabilitation by overwhelming margins . . . ." Id. at n.*. 
275. Cait Clarke, Problem-Solving Defenders, supra note56, at 11.82 (commenting that "[nlationwide 
defender leaders and managers are now discussing ways to expand the role of defender inside their offices, 
in the justice system, and in their communities. For example the Bureau of Justice Assistance is funding 
a multi-year Executive Session on Indigent Defense Systems at Harvard's Kennedy School of Government 
with the goal of improving the effectiveness of the defense function in state systems. . . . Likewise, the Vera 
Institute of Justice operates a National Defender Leadership Project (NDLP) that provides training to assist 
defender managers to realize fully their potential leadership roles in the system."). "For the importance of 
providing a voice to criminal defendants, see John B. Mitchell, Narrative and Client-Centered 
Representation: What is a True Believer to Do When His Two Favorite Theories Collide, 6 CLINICALL. 
REV. 85.98-101 (1999) (criminal defense lawyer arguing the importance of 'culling much fuller stories 
from my clients and actively involving them in lawyering strategy and decision making'). Professor 
Mitchell now 'cringes' as he recalls his early lawyering days, when he saw his clients as little more than 
an impediment to winning 'his' case." See also Kim Taylor-Thompson, Effective Assistance: 
Reconceiving the Role of the Chief Public Defender, 2 J. INST. STUD. LEG. ETHICS 199 (1999) (arguing that 
Chief Public defenders need to "break out o f .  . . their roles forcing them to operate solely within budget 
guidelines"). 
276. See Stuntz, supra note 92, at 5. 'The post-1960 constitutionalization of criminal procedure 
arose, in large part, out of the sense that the system was treating black suspects and defendant much worse 
than white ones. Warren-era constitutional criminal procedure began as a kind of antidiscrimination law." 
Id. 
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underprivileged and work for a more just so~iety."~ Second, young attorneys 
were attracted to defense work because it gave them an opportunity to try 
cases-to challenge authority in an acceptable form.278 Both motivations 
focus on outcomes-winning was everything. 
Since then, criminal procedure has changed. Today rights jurisprudence 
is less important to the eventual outcome of a case than is the reasonableness 
of police conduct.279 As a result, young defenders are less able to win pre-trial 
motions based on constitutional violations. Advocates must look at other 
approaches to winning cases and helping clients. Possibly defenders will 
devote increased attention to building true defenses to criminal 
charges--defenses such as alibi, justification, mistake, lack of intent-that 
focus on questions of innocence and guilt and degrees of each rather than on 
the behavior of the police. Building these defenses requires more out-of-court 
time and preparation than simply cross-examining police behavior at a 
hearing. At a pre-trial hearing on a motion to suppress evidence for violation 
of constitutional rights, counsel can use the police reports prepared by the 
testifying officers that will be turned over as discovery by the prosecutor just 
before the hearing starts.280 To prepare a defense of alibi, on the other hand, 
defense counsel must locate, interview, and prepare the witness--on his or her 
own. Defense counsel cannot rely on the police or the prosecutor to assist or 
to have any information about the existence of this potential witness. To 
refute the prosecutor's charge that the defendant intended to kill his victim, 
to chose another example, counsel will have to locate, hire, prepare and pay 
an expert. In order to conduct a competent evaluation, the expert must have 
information about the accused's life prior to arrest. That information, in turn, 
must be tracked down and subpoenaed. In order to accomplish these goals, 
defenders need sufficient investigative staff, motivation, and the time to 
277. Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., Beyond Justifications: Seeking Motivations to Sustain Public 
Defenders, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1239, 1275 (1993) (reflecting on his reasons for becoming a public 
defender). 
I saw myself as a kind of 'hero' of the oppressed, the one who fights against all odds, a sort of Robin 
Hood figure who can conquer what others cannot and who does not have to conform to the moral 




279. See generally COLE, supra note 1, at 16-62 (illustrating how the federal courts have cut back 
on the protection provided by the fourth amendment to give the police greater latitude to search 
individuals-particularly poor, young, minority individuals). 
280. N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW 8 240.43 (McKinney 1993). 
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prepare their cases.281 If defenders start to litigate more expensive factual 
claims rather than, or in addition to, the fairly easy and cheap legal claims 
which have been rendered largely ineffectual by the conservative trends in the 
law, the amount of case-preparation required for the defense will expand. 
If the trends in capital litigation can be seen as a bellwether for the 
direction that criminal law is taking generally, current doctrine is hinting that 
courts are already ascribing more value to a thorough and complete factual 
investigation. In capital cases, where the issue of ineffectiveness of counsel 
has been raised on appeal or by collateral motion, convictions are more often 
reversed for failure to present mitigation evidence or on account of the 
complete absence of an investigation than for failure to raise constitutional 
rights. In fact, the failure to investigate and feature evidence which might 
have convinced a jury to vote for life was the single most common example 
of attorney ineffectiveness in the Columbia University long term study of error 
rates in capital cases.282 
Moreover, in addition to the reduced the power of rights jurisprudence, 
the nature of criminal adjudication has evolved. Most cases are pled. Trials 
281. Stuntz, supra note 92, at 40 (compellingly explaining how assigned and appointed defenders 
prefer to bring legal claims such as suppression motions or speedy trial dismissal motions). He argues this 
is because 
[flactual arguments are not merely harder to prepare and pursue than legal claims; they are harder 
to evaluate. And quick evaluation is key. In a system in which ninety-plus percent of convictions 
are by guilty plea and in which public defenders represent hundreds of felony defendants per year, 
defense lawyers' most important job is triage: deciding which (few) cases to contest somewhat, 
which (very few) cases to contest seriously, and which ones not to contest at all. . . . In such a world, 
factual arguments--claims that the defendant did not do the crime, or acted in self-defense, or 
lacked the requisite mens era-tend to require nontrivial investigation simply to establish whether 
there is any argument to make. Most possible challenges to the legality of a police search, 
meanwhile, appear on the face of the police report . . . . 
The relevant choice, therefore, is not whether to file a suppression motion or make a self- 
defense argument, but whether to file the motion or find out if the argument even exists, in a 
world where it probably doesn't. Given how cheap is the process that decides the suppression 
motion, and given the expense of both determining whether the self-defense argument is worth 
making and actually taking that argument to trial, the system places substantial pressure on 
counsel to opt for the procedural claim rather than the (potential) substantive one. 
Id. 
282. Liebman, Fagan & West, supra note 3. This finding is startling becausevery few ineffectiveness 
claims succeed on appeal. According to David Cole, 
[o]f 103 reported cases raising such claims in the California Supreme Court from January 1,1989, 
through April 21,1996.94 were denied, 3 were remanded for further factual development, and only 
6 were granted. Of 158 reported cases raising such claims in the United States Court of Appeals 
for the Fifth Circuit during the same period, 142 were denied, 10, remanded, and 6 granted. 
COLE, supra note 1 ,  at 80. Cole admits that these numbers are probably conservative, since many denials 
are unpublished and no reversals are. 
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resolve only a small number of cases.283 Because trial skills, or the lack 
thereof, affect only a small number of cases, pre-trial work should be 
emphasized, because finding out what really happened, who the witnesses are, 
and what they could have seen is the only key to a favorable dispo~ition?~~ 
Furthermore, current criminal justice policy has swept more and different 
kinds of people into the criminal justice system.28s More children are being 
arrested and charged as adults. More non-citizens are arrested. More 
mentally ill individuals are caught up in the criminal justice system. Criminal 
defense attorneys must represent them all and respond to their very different 
needs. To handle those diverse challenges, attorneys must be skilled 
interviewers and counselors. They must notice when a client is not 
responding to questions. They must recognize when a client has been arrested 
only because he is homeless and living on the streets. 
Finally, specialized courts requiring specialized case-resolution skills are 
rapidly gaining favor across the country.286 Drug courts have proliferated 
wildly from their inception in Dade County, Florida.287 In these targeted 
rehabilitation courts, the accused gives up the right to contest the charges and 
283. CRIMINAL COURT OFTHE CITY OF NEW YORK, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (Jan. 2,1994) (statistics 
of 1993 criminal court filings separated into various categories showing that in 1993 there were only 943 
felony mals and 231 misdemeanor trials in the entire city of New York, although in that year there were 
a total of 276,401 criminal charges brought); STATEOFNEW YORKREPORTOFTHECHIEF ADMINISTRATIVE 
JUDGE OF THE COURTS FOR 1998 (1999) (on file with the Chief Administrative Judge). 
284. Important or not, fact investigation has not been integrated into the typical law school 
curriculum, despite the fact that fact investigation has been recognized as a crucial lawyering skill by the 
ABA Clinical Skills Section which identifies the many ways in which the legal profession serves the public 
and describes the skills and values necessary for practice. &GAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL 
DEVELOPMENT-AN EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM (Robert MacCrate ed., 1993). It categorizes the crucial 
lawyering skills and values as: Problem Solving; Legal Analysis and Reasoning; Fact Investigation; 
Communication; Counseling; Negotiation; Litigation and Alternative Dispute Resolution; Organization and 
Management of Legal Work and Recognizing and Resolving Ethical Standards. Id. at 129-98. In fact, it 
could be argued that a pervasive emphasis on trial advocacy skills has actually trained young lawyers 
against conduct fact investigation by handing them a prepared trial package that contains every document 
they need. Only in clinical courses where students actually handle cases is fact investigation taught and 
rewarded. 
285. Order maintenance policing, which has been loudly praised for reducing violent crime in New 
York City, relies for its effectiveness on arresting the "disorderly." Harcourt, supra note 263, at 343 ('The 
disorderly are, after all, the usual suspects under a regime of order-maintenance policing. The squeegee 
man, the panhandler, the homeless person, the turnstile jumper, the unattached adult, the public 
drunk-these are apparently the true culprits of serious crime."). 
286. See, e.g., Susan K .  Knipps & Greg Berman, New York's Problem-Solving Courts Provide 
Meaningful Alternative to Traditional Remedies, N.Y. ST. B.A. J., June 2000, at 8 (discussing the use of 
such specialized courts in New York). 
287. See LEE, supra note 57. 
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agrees to enter long-term treatment.288 Referrals are suggested by a counselor 
who evaluates the accused and determines the appropriate medical approach. 
Treatment is monitored by the The role of the defender in these 
treatment courts is substantially less adversarial-and perhaps less 
clear-than in most courts where adjudication is premised on a traditional 
adversarial contest.290 
These intertwining forces have shifted the heart of defense work from 
trial advocacy-which concentrates on legal analysis, rhetoric, and the 
advocates' presentation skills-to pre-trial preparation, sentencing advocacy, 
diversion and mitigation. Today, as a result of these changes in the criminal 
justice system, organizations providing public defense services are training 
their lawyers in diversionary work, investigation, and client-centered 
counseling, as their staff handle fewer serious crimes and more "quality of life 
offenses,"291 fewer adults and more children. For the first time, legal services 
offices are searching for ways to evaluate the different services they are 
providing to clients as they re-assess their role. Some are even conducting 
client satisfaction surveys.292 Further, exonerations of the innocent and 
reversals of improperly imposed death sentences should force even the most 
well-respected and highly skilled public defense organizations to re-think their 
approach to cases. 
Courts may more easily see the rushed and cursory services provided by 
an overburdened defender as violating the Sixth Amendment if those courts 
understand the increasingly more complex role of the defender. Then the 
288. Richard C. Boldt, Rehabilitative Punishment and the Drug Treatment Couri Movement, 76 
WASH. U. L.Q. 1205, 1246-54 (1998). 
289. Id. 
290. Id. 
29 1. Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street Stops and Broken Windows: Teny, Rate, and  iso order 
in New York City, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 457,476 (2000) (finding that New York City law enforcement, 
as a result of reliance on "Order-Maintenance Policing" (OMP), an offshoot of the popular Broken 
Windows theory of policing which links disorder to violence, has vastly increased the numbers of 
misdemeanor arrests made each year, but that, at the same time, there has been a "sharp decline in [the] 
quality and sustainability in court" of those arrests). Misdemeanor arrests have increased from 129,404 in 
1993 to 215,158 in 1998. Id. (citing Division of Criminal Justice Services, State of New York, Criminal 
Justice Indicators: New York City, 1995-1999, at http://www.criminaljustice.state.ny.us/c 
areastat/areastat.html). At the same time "the rate at which prosecutors declined to pursue those cases rose" 
as well. Id. "In 1998, prosecutors dismissed 18,000 of the 345,000 misdemeanor and felony arrests, 
approximately twice the number dismissed in 1993." Id. (citing Ford Fessenden & David Rohde, Dismissed 
Before Reaching Courr: Flawed Arrests Rise in New York, N.Y. RMES, Aug. 23, 1999, at Al). 
292. See Clarke, supra note 275 (The Bronx Defenders, a young small defense organization in one 
of the boroughs of New York City, has begun to use client satisfaction Surveys to learn how its lawyers 
could be doing a better job in arraignments.). 
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adjudicatory process should carry increased significance. Outcomes will not 
be the only measure of effectiveness. The evolution of the role of defense 
attorney from gladiator to client-centered counselor may be the coordinating 
idea that, when combined with motivation, information, and precedent, 
inspires the courts to make policy. 
Some commentators believe the judiciary will never improve the quality 
of criminal defense services, whether by applying Strickland or any other 
standard, because money is the essential ingredient for the "elimination of 
factors conducive to widespread no-fault ineffectivenes~,"~~~ and the courts do 
not control appropriations. Those critics say courts can do little to improve 
attorney performance through the application of constitutional principles. I 
disagree. As Professor Dripps so powerfully put it, everyone agrees that 
Gideon was correctly decided.294 There is near unanimity that public defense 
systems must be improved.295 Finally, all who have seriously considered the 
question agree that Strickland has not worked either to prevent miscarriages 
of justice or to improve attorney performance. If the legislature refuses to 
support the defense function, the criminal justice community and the courts 
must devise a solution. I believe they can. 
293. Vivian 0. Berger, The Supreme Court and Defense Counsel: Old Roads, New Paths-A Dead 
End?, 86 COLUM. L.REV. 9. 115 (1986). 
294. Dripps, supra note 53, at page 307-08. 
295. I have only come across a single study concluding that public defense is doing a "good job. 
The study was completed by the National Center for State Courts. It is entitled Indigent Defenders Get the 
Job Done and Done Well, and was submitted to the State Justice Institute in 1992. The report finds that 
public defenders do a comparable job to that performed by private retained counsel. The authors chose odd 
criteria to measure effectiveness-speed for example. The report found that public defenders process cases 
more quickly than do private practitioners. The authors believed rapid case processing to be a measure of 
success. Most other observers would probably disagree. 
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